A REPORT
OF THE
FACT FINDING MISSION IN UGANDA
ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FEBRUARY 2002
Email:
kituo@kituochakatiba.co.ug
P.O. Box 3277
Kampala, Uganda
Tel/fax 256 - 041- 251717
CONTENT
1.0 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION_________________________________
1.1
Introduction_______________________________________________________
1.2.
Initiating the Process________________________________________________
1.3.
Composition of the Fact Finding Mission________________________________
1.4.
Goal of the Fact-Finding Mission_______________________________________
1.5 Objectives of the Fact Finding Mission:__________________________________
1.6.
Persons Interviewed by the Mission____________________________________
1.7.
Persons who could not meet the Mission________________________________
1.8 The Methodology of the Interviewing Process and Report___________________
1.9 Appreciation________________________________________________________
2.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA_____________________
13
2.1 The Independence Constitution_______________________________________
13
2.2 The Pigeonhole Constitution_________________________________________
14
2.3 The Republican Constitution of 1967___________________________________
14
2.4 The 1995 Constitution______________________________________________
15
2.5 Towards Amending the 1995 Constitution______________________________
18
3. HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN UGANDA__________________
19
3.1 Multiparty System under the 1962 Constitution__________________________
19
3.2 The Monarchical System____________________________________________
19
3.3 Towards A One-Party Political System_________________________________
21
3.4 Military Political System_______________________________________________
3.5 The Movement Political System______________________________________
23
4. LEGAL ARTICULATION OF THE MOVEMENT SYSTEM_________________
25
4.1 Genesis of the Movement System During the Armed Struggle of the 1980’s___
25
4.2 Elements and Salient Features of the Movement System___________________
25
4.3 Constituent Assembly Debate on the Movement System___________________
25
4.4 Statutory Amplification of the Movement System_________________________
27
4.5 Judicial Interpretation of the Movement Legal Provisions_________________
30
4.6
Academic Debate on the Movement System____________________________
33
5. INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CONDUCTING A MOVEMENT VERSUS MULTIPARTY DEBATE_____________________________________________________________
61
5.1
Media___________________________________________________________
64
5.2 Referendum______________________________________________________
64
5.3 Electoral Campaigns________________________________________________
65
5.4 Political Parties Fora________________________________________________
65
5.5 Ad-hoc Committee of NEC___________________________________________
65
5.6 The Constitution Review Commission_________________________________
65
6.0 MISSION FINDINGS________________________________________________
36
6.1
Background to the Fact-finding Mission_______________________________
36
6.2.
Origin of the Controversy on Political Systems__________________________
36
6.3.
The Timing of Expansion of Political Space_____________________________
37
6.4
Against Immediate Expansion of Political Space_________________________
37
6.5
In Favour of Liberalisation of Political Space____________________________
39
6.6
The Current Status of Political Parties_________________________________
44
6.7
The Role of President Museveni_____________________________________
45
6.8
The Donor Factor_________________________________________________
45
6.9
Challenges______________________________________________________
47
6.9.1.
The Army_____________________________________________________
47
6.9.2.
Uganda: a militaristic country?_____________________________________
49
Arguments for Mchaka Mchaka:_______________________________________________
50
Arguments against Mchaka Mchaka___________________________________________
51
6.9.3.
Succession
_______________________________________________________
51
6.9.4.
Lack of Constructive Debate______________________________________
52
6.9.5.
Lack of Societal Consensus on a Political System._____________________
53
6.9.6.
Commitment/Good Will of the Government__________________________
54
6.9.7.
Harmonising the Constitutional Review Process______________________
54
a) The Constitutional Review Process_____________________________________________
55
b)
The Movement Think Tank________________________________________________
56
6.9.8.
The Electoral Commission________________________________________
57
6.9.9.
The Buganda Factor_____________________________________________
57
6.10
Opportunities__________________________________________________
58
6.10.1.
The Media___________________________________________________
58
6.10.2.
An Independent Judiciary______________________________________
58
6.10.3.
The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC)___________________
59
6.10.4.
The Role of Religious Institutions________________________________
59
6.10.5
A Vibrant Civil Society___________________________________________
59
6.10.6
Regional Intervention___________________________________________
59
6.11
Recommendations of Respondents_____________
Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.11.1
Managing the Change Process_________________
Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.11.2.
The Vision of One Uganda/Government of National Unity
Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.11.3.
Defining the Debate_______________________
Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.11.4.
The Army________________________________
Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.11.5. Civic Education_________________________________________________
63
6.11.6
Other Recommendations_____________________
Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.0
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS____________________________________
60
8.0
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MISSION____________________________
67
List of Abbreviations____________________________________________________
CP
-
Conservative Party__________________________________________
5
CRC
-
Constitution Review Commission_______________________________
5
APPENDIX I_________________________________________________________
76
List of Persons Interviewed_____________________________________________
76
2.
H.E. Tom Philips
-
British High Commissioner________________________________
76
APPENDIX II________________________________________________________
78
Literature and Laws Available to the Mission_______________________________
78
APPENDIX III
Workshop Report
CA - Constituent Assembly
CBR - Centre for Basic Research
CLARION - Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION)
DP - Democratic Party
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC - East African Community
EALR - East African Law Review
EC - Electoral Commission
KAP - Kalangala Action Plan
KCK. - Kituo cha Katiba
KY - Kabaka Yekka
LC - Local Council
LDU - Local Defence Unit
NEC - National Executive Committee
NRM - National Resistance Movement
POB - Political Parties & Organisations Bill
PPU - Presidential Protection Unit
UHRC - Uganda Human Rights Commission
UJCC - Uganda Joint Christian Council
ULS - Uganda Law Society
UPC - Uganda People’s Congress
UPDF - Uganda People’s Defence Force
UPPC - Uganda Publishers & Printers Corporation
1.1
Introduction
Kituo Cha Katiba was established in 1997 with the mission of promoting constitutionalism and democratic governance in the East African Region. Kituo Cha Katiba provides a mechanism and neutral forum for activists, academicians and politicians to engage in dialogue, self reflection and critical debate over a wide variety of issues that are of critical contemporary relevance. The ultimate aim of the
organisation is to promote the active participation of civil society in good governance and to inculcate a culture of constitutionalism where the constitution is a living document that reflects the aspirations and needs of the common people.
KCK is governed by a Board whose members come from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zanzibar. Its secretariat is currently
based in Kampala, Uganda.
1.2.1. Political Systems Question : The 1995 Constitution of Uganda contains several fairly progressive provisions, such as a strong Bill of Rights with increased capacities for enforcement, and various provisions relating to popular representation and restriction on the arbitrary exercise of executive power. The above notwithstanding, entrenched in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, is the “no-party” or “Movement” system of government, based on personal merit rather than organised political action. The proponents of the Multi-party political system in Uganda argue that the Movement system is detrimental to democracy and the protection of fundamental civil and political rights. Thus, the restriction of political parties under Article 269 of the Constitution has implications for the fundamental human rights to freedom of assembly, association, and expression. On the other hand, the proponents of the Movement System argue that it has the constitutional right and mandate of the people of Uganda as determined by the 2000 Referendum on Political Systems. This controversy dominated the Presidential campaign, leading to the establishment of a Constitution Review Commission. .
1.2.2. In June 2001, KCK, in collaboration with the Faculty of Law, Makerere University and Foundation for Human Rights Initiative held a joint Workshop to Promote Dialogue on the Constitutional Review Process in Uganda. The workshop was convoked in view of the need to initiate a dialogue within civil society on the 1995 Constitution review process. Over 50 participants drawn from all sectors of civil society attended the Workshop. Representatives of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), the President’s Office, and several members of the Constitution Review Commission, including the Chairperson, Prof. F. Sempebwa, were in attendance. The said workshop enunciated its position on the issues to be addressed by the Commission during its 18-month mandate, and formulated concrete collective recommendations to guide the Commission in its work. A consensus was reached on a number of recommendations, and the fundamental importance of further debate was recognized on several of the more contentious issues, particularly the Political Systems Question.
1.2.3. Additionally, KCK undertook a similar Mission to Kenya in September 2001. The Mission findings were disseminated at the National Dialogue on Constitutional Development in Kenya, held in November 2001. It was emphatically recommended by the Workshop participants that KCK replicate the exercise in other East African countries in order to cement a culture of constitutionalism and good governance in the region.
1.2.4. Furthermore, the conference delegates to The Constitutionalism in Transition: Eastern Europe and Africa, held in January 2002, underscored the desire for Africans to experiment and construct the new project of transition in a manner that is broadly reflective of their lived experiences, rather than endure the tyranny of borrowed paradigms. Democratization is a struggle and contestation rather than a destination. It was highly recommended that KCK investigates Uganda’s No-Party constitutional experiment as a case study to build on constitutional discourse, problematize the processes of transition in their variegated forms and to specifically analyse the quality of Uganda’s transition in order to draw lessons for countries involved in constitutional transitions.
1.2.5. Amidst the controversy over the type of political system Uganda should adopt, KCK undertook to engage concerned and reputable East Africans from Kenya and Tanzania to provide an objective and impartial analysis of this issue. Notwithstanding the reservations of whether the Constitution Review process would be transparent, would lead to fundamental change, or whether it was purely a public relations exercise, KCK believes that it is important to engage the review processes for several reasons. Among others, the constitution review process provided a strategic chance to open a civil society debate on the best way to achieve a peaceful and progressive transition to full democratisation.
There was unanimous acclaim for the East African intervention organised by KCK and to the Mission for presenting a very rational, balanced and honest report. The intervention by Tanzanians and Kenyans was particularly commended as a reflection of the transition towards true East Africaness, as well as an objective mechanism for promoting political dialogue in Uganda. More profoundly, participants underscored the role of civil society in initiating constitutional dialogue and development, as opposed to limiting politics solely to the Executive and the Legislature. KCK was therefore hailed for filling the vacuum that had hitherto existed for a neutral forum and open debate on Uganda’s political liberalization. More such debate was called for in future.
It was in the above spirit that KCK organised a fact finding mission comprising distinguished personalities from Tanzania and Kenya, which took place from April 15th to 19th 2002. The delegation was comprised of:
1. Prof. Haroub Othman (TANZANIA), Professor, University of Dar es Salaam; Chairman, Zanzibar Legal Services Centre; and former U.N. Chief Technical Advisor, Office for the Promotion of Good Governance, Liberia. Head of the Fact Finding Mission.
2. Hon. Fatuma Magimbi (TANZANIA), Former Member of Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania for Chake Chake Constituency in Pemba and Official Leader of the Opposition in Parliament.
3. Prof. Kivutha Kibwana (KENYA), Professor of Law, University of Nairobi and Executive Director of Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION).
4. Ms. Kagwiria Mbogori (KENYA): Executive Director of the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya Chapter (ICJ-K).
5. Mr. Thomas Mihayo: (TANZANIA) Secretary General East Africa Law Society and President Tanganyika Law Society
6. Mr. John Kiarie Njoroge: (KENYA) Co-ordinator Justice & Peace Programme of the Catholic Archdiocese of Nairobi.
The goal of the fact-finding mission was to seek a mediation between the two political groups and to offer some insights on how to avert the dismantling of the constitutional order in Uganda. It is hoped that the Mission will facilitate a process of dialogue and tolerance and provide a forum for the amicable solution of the tensions in the country, as
well as offer regional support for the current constitutional review process. In other words, the
Fact
Finding Mission was
conceived out of genuine concern for
East Africa as a region and the need for Uganda to succeed in its quest for progressive democratic order.
1.5.
Objectives of the fact finding mission:
a) To initiate dialogue with all stakeholders with varied interests and differing views in order to form a rational opinion about the Constitutional Process in Uganda.
b) To provide a mechanism and neutral forum for activists, academicians and politicians to engage in dialogue, self reflection and critical debate over constitutional development in Uganda and act as a conduit of negotiation between government and civil society.
c) To provide regional support for constitutional development in the Uganda.
d) To enable critical actors in the ongoing processes in the region to share experiences and learn from each others mistakes and best practices.
1.6.
Persons Interviewed by the Mission
The delegation met with varied stakeholders, including: key government officials including Ministers, Members of Parliament and historical members of the Movement; members of the East African Legislative Assembly; leaders of political parties such as the Uganda People Congress (UPC), the Conservative Party (CP) and the Democratic Party (DP); former presidential candidates; representatives from
political pressure groups such as the Reform Agenda and the Free Movement; political activists; Ambassadors; Representatives of foreign development agencies; religious leaders; cultural leaders;
human rights and civic organizations including the Uganda Human Rights Commission; academia; the media and the Youth. The full list of those interviewed by the mission is appended to this report.
1.7.
Persons who could not meet the Mission
For reasons
beyond the knowledge of the organisers, The Women organisations as a constituency
were the only group that were unable to meet with the Mission on the scheduled appointment.
A number of other respondents, earmarked for interviews were unable to meet with the mission for various reasons including collision of schedules and being outside the country.
1.8.The Methodology of the interviewing Process and Report
Time was of essence and the mission undertook the interviews within a span of one week. The report is consequently highly qualitative. Given the constraint of time, while it was not feasible to interview ordinary Ugandans, the Mission managed to interview a cross-section of people who by and large represent the broad spectrum of Ugandan political views on both the constitutional review exercise and the political system. In response to the concern raised about the focus on what one critic described as “first class” respondents sampled, the Mission acknowledges the limitation presented by the absence of an in-depth survey of the opinion of members of rural communities within the available time. The above notwithstanding, the objective of the Mission was not to substitute itself for the CRC. It is quite obvious that in order to create appropriate conditions for progress towards plural politics in Uganda and maximise democratic opportunities within the present constitutional set up, there is a need to expand the participation of the people in the constitution review exercise. In other words, the constitution review process must be as extensive and inclusive as existing circumstances in Uganda permit.
There was no structured questionnaire. Each respondent was requested to give his or her own assessment of the political situation in Uganda. The Chairperson of the Mission controlled the debate. Through a discussion, the Mission asked questions for the purpose of gaining clarity or directing focus on a particular aspect of investigation.
The Mission assured the respondents of the confidentiality of the interview. Additionally, due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed and with the aim of preserving the impartiality of the Mission, none of the Ugandan Board members of KCK were interviewed nor included in the Mission. Notes were taken by the Executive Director of KCK, assisted by the Programme Officer, who are bound by the Confidentiality Policy of KCK. The above provided a relaxed atmosphere for honest discussion. This report does not make specific reference to any respondent. However, it provides verbatim quotes to capture meaning and content where necessary.
KCK disseminated the draft report at a National workshop held on June 12th 2002. The objectives of the Dissemination workshop were the following
·
To enable Ugandans critically and objectively examine the collective findings of the mission in order to reach an informed decision on the way forward.
·
To solicit the views of Ugandans on the collected findings with the objective of enriching the
final report.
The workshop was attended by over 140 participants drawn from a cross section of Ugandan society and representing a broad spectrum of Ugandan, including many of the respondents who were interviewed, and those who could not meet the Mission as well as
the general
public. Prof. Ssempebwa, the Chairperson of the Constitution Review Commission,
officiated as guest of honour.
The views of workshop participants comfirmed many of the conclusions of the Mission. Some of the workshop observations and recommendations
are accordingly incorporated in this report.
Two issues were raised at the workshop that are not given the extensive coverage requested by workshop participants. These were the phenomenon of
federalism and the question of elections in Uganda. The mission regrets that it was not feasible to incorporate a thorough study of these issues within the time left before the Commission officially winds up its duties. As such, the suggested studies would constitute independent studies by KCK.
Appreciation
The Fact Finding Mission would like to thank all the respondents who spent their invaluable time to discuss this very important question. It found their interaction not only insightful but also very frank and honest. This has promoted the quality of the report.
Uganda attained its independence in 1962. As in many other British colonies, the independence constitution was bestowed on Uganda by an act of the British parliament. There is no way therefore that that constitution could be considered as deriving its legitimacy from the Ugandan people. Jim Paul aptly describes the process of constitutional promulgation throughout Anglophone Africa:
Independence constitutions were like negotiated treaties. They were often more the product of ad hoc bargaining in London than the reflection of popular demands and manifestations of indigenous political culture. They were also often extraordinarily complex. But by accepting a constitutional document worked out in London on the eve of independence, a regime in Africa could hasten the attainment of national sovereignty and the entrenchment of its own power. Once independent, the regime could change the constitution to suit local needs, and not surprisingly, to tighten its own control over the political system [J. C. N. Paul 1974: “Some Observations on Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in Africa,” in Ohio State Law Journal, vol.35.]
Those imposed constitutional documents were expected to survive to eternity. But in almost all Africa, they did not survive for long; and even when they did survive, they had undergone so many changes that at times it became difficult to relate them to the original texts. Uganda was no exception. Within a period of four years, in 1966, the independence constitution was overthrown by the very personalities that were supposed to protect it. Many reasons have been advanced as to why Milton Obote, the Prime Minister at the time, had to attack the existing constitutional order, but it is obvious that that is the genesis of the constitutional crisis which is still ongoing.
The independence constitution gave Uganda a ceremonial Head of State and a federal arrangement between the kingdom of Buganda and the Republic of Uganda. Of this arrangement, Yash Ghai has remarked that it was an attempt “… to achieve the impossible”, abundant as it was in unworkable compromises, institutionalised inequalities and attempts at isolating a part of the country (Buganda) from the mainstream of national politics [Ghai 1968: ‘Matovu’s Case: Another Government’, EALR, p.191]. When this arrangement failed to function, Prime Minister Milton Obote decided to stage a coup and force the Buganda king who was also the Ugandan Head of State into exile. Obote assumed the functions of Head of State and ruled the country for one year under an Interim Constitution.
The 1966 Interim Constitution, which Milton Obote imposed on Uganda after forcing the Kabaka of Buganda into exile, is referred to as the ‘Pigeonhole Constitution’ because it is said that members of Parliament found copies of the constitution in their pigeonholes for them to approve! The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights put these developments succinctly:
In February 1966 the Prime Minister suspended the 1962 Constitution. This was a unilateral action taken without consulting either Parliament or the people of Uganda. For a couple of months Uganda was literally governed without a Constitution. Then the 1966 Constitution was put in the pigeonholes of the Members of Parliament and they were asked to approve it even before reading it, and they did. In other words, this Parliament suddenly, and without consulting anybody, constituted themselves into a Constituent Assembly. They enacted and promulgated a constitution whose contents they did not even know. [Republic of Uganda (1994): The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights. Kampala].
The 1967 Constitution can be said to be the first home-grown constitution. Though it came as a result of the 1966 crisis and its legitimacy has been questioned by many, the fact remains that it was the first attempt at constitution-making by Ugandans themselves. It is true that it ushered in many undemocratic principles and did not involve popular participation in its formulation, yet it remained a point of reference until the current constitution was promulgated in 1995. Zie Gariyo clearly depicts the mood of the time:
The events of 1966 after the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution, the deposition and exiling of the first President of Uganda, the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of the so-called republican constitution depicted a deeply polarised political atmosphere in Uganda. For several years to come, most political and social rights were curtailed by the UPC regime. Parliament was not only rendered inactive but many of its opposition members, characteristic of their narrow political scope, had already “crossed” the floor to join the ruling regime. Any pretence at rudimentary democratic practice was rendered meaningless by this single act [Zie Gariyo1993: The Media, Constitutionalism and Democracy in Uganda, CBR Working Paper No.32, August].
The Constitution vested all Executive power in the hands of the President. In fact Art. 24.3 stated that the President is to “… take precedence over all persons in Uganda and shall not be liable in any proceedings whatsoever in any court”. Abu Mayanja, in an article in the Transition magazine, criticised the constitution in this manner:
The keynote of the proposals is the concentration of all powers of government – legislative, executive, administrative, and judiciary – into central Government institutions and the subjection of those institutions to the control of one man – the President. The result is the creation – not of a republic, but of a one-man
dictatorship
[Abu Mayanja1967: “The Government’s Proposals for a new Constitution of Uganda”, in
Transition
, vol.7 (1), August/September].
Dan Nabudere, however, was of the opinion that
“the 1967 Constitution in the main preserves the Old Order and leaves it intact
” [Nabudere quoted in J. Oloka-Onyango: Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda, CBR Working Paper No.30, January 1993].
Upon coming to power in January 1986 after many years of turmoil, wars and military dictatorships, the NRM government promised a new constitution for Uganda. This was in line with the promise it made while still fighting in the bush:
… as part of laying the ground work for returning Uganda to democratic government, the Interim Administration shall see to it that a new Constitution based on the popular will, is drafted and promulgated by a Constituent Assembly elected by the people themselves. The present Constitution (1967) was drafted by Obote to answer the needs of establishing a despotic state. It contains many provisions that are anti-democracy, and returning the country to democratic rule under such constitution would lead to a quick demise of democracy once more [NRM Secretariat, Mission to Freedom Uganda Resistance News, 1981-1985, NRM Publications, Kampala 1990:20-21].
In 1988 the NRM government passed Statute No. 5 which came into force on 21st of December 1988 by Statutory Instrument of 1989 that established the Uganda Constitutional Commission. The Commission was mandated (S. 4) to “Study and review the Constitution with a view to making proposals for the enactment of a national Constitution that will, inter alia:
1. Guarantee the national independence and territorial integrity and sovereignty of Uganda;
2. Establish a free and democratic system of government that will guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda;
3. Create viable political institutions that will ensure maximum consensus and orderly succession to Government;
4. Recognise and demarcate division of responsibility among the State Organs of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, and create viable checks and balances between them;
5. Endeavour to develop a system of Government that ensures peoples participation in the governance of the country;
6. Endeavour to develop a democratic, free and fair electoral system that will ensure true people’s representation in the legislature and other levels;
7. Formulate and structure a draft Constitution that will form the basis for the country’s new national system.
In order to carry out its work, the Commission was empowered (S. 5) among other things to:
· Seek the views of the general public through holding public meetings and debates, seminars, workshops and any other form;
· Stimulate public discussions and awareness of constitutional issues.
The Commission itself had its own guiding principles [Republic of Uganda (1993): The Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission – Analysis and Recommendations. UPPC, Entebbe].
In its presentation to the Constitutional Commission, the Uganda Law Society stated:
The Law Society appreciates as an historical fact that past Uganda Constitutions have not been the result of political consensus of Ugandans. The same have been mainly the work of few interested groups that happened to possess political power at the time and as such those constitutions tended to protect the political interests of these groups rather than providing a framework of governance of Uganda based upon a collective political will of all Ugandans.
The Commission when appointed had 21 members. These were appointed by the President of the Republic in consultation with the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The Director of Legal Affairs in the National Resistance Movement Secretariat and the Chief Political Commissar in the National Resistance Army sat in as ex-officio members. On 31st December 1992 the Commission submitted its Report and a Draft Constitution to the President of the Republic. The Constitution was enacted by the Constituent Assembly on 22nd September 1995, and on 8th October 1995 it was promulgated into law.
Criticism has been levelled at the way the Constituent Assembly was elected and the way the Constitution was enacted into law. In Rwanyarare & 2 Others vs. Attorney General [Miscellaneous Application No. 85 of 1993], the Constitutional Court ruled that Legal Notice 1 of 1986, which gave constitutional and legal basis to the NRM regime, was superior to the 1967 Constitution and that rules made by the NRM government to adapt the 1967 Constitution were valid.
When the 1995 Constitution was promulgated on 8th October 1995, it was hoped that it would stand the test of time. But the Constitution left many issues unresolved, such as the demand for federalism, the kind of political system to be followed, the question of land, and others. Six years after the promulgation of the Constitution, the government appointed a Commission to review the Constitution. [The Minister of Justice & Constitutional Affairs announced the appointment of the Commission on 7th February 2001. The instrument of appointment was published on 9th February 2001 as Legal Notice No.1 of 2001]. The Commission has been given twenty terms of reference, and is expected to submit its report within eighteen months after commencing its duties, though it may submit interim reports on any matter at any time.
3. HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN UGANDAPolitical parties started to emerge in Uganda in 1952 with the formation of the Uganda National Congress (UNC). Thereafter there emerged a proliferation of parties, prominent among them being the Democratic Party (DP), Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Kabaka Yekka (KY). It was these parties that led the independence struggle, though in that quest for independence they did not seem to be much concerned with Uganda’s freedom or interested in creating a foundation for a multiparty democracy. Instead, their major concern was “who was to inherit the mantle of power from the departing colonialists and what security there would be for each of the diverse ethnic groups in the new state” [Grace Ibingira (1980): African Upheavals Since Independence, New York: Western Press].
Article 17 (b) of the 1962 Independence Constitution provided that “every person shall enjoy the fundamental rights of the individual, that is to say freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association”. But multipartyism did not exist for long after independence. After 1964 Uganda became a de facto one-party state. In 1969 there was an attempted assassination of Milton Obote, and this led to the banning of all opposition parties. In fact the Obote regime was in the process of imposing a de jure one-party political system when it was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971.
During the Colonial era, the British applied a system of indirect rule, which recognised the kingdoms in Uganda. Agreements were signed with the existing monarchs, resulting in the Buganda Agreement, the Toro Agreement, The Ankole Agreement and the Bunyoro Agreement. On Independence, the country got a multi-party Westminster system of government. Under the 1962 Constitution, Uganda was comprised of federal states of the Kingdom of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro as well as Busoga, in addition to the districts of Acholi, Bugishu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei and Teso. In effect, each of the monarchs had an independent system of governance, and as such there was no single monarchy.
The President and the Vice President were to be elected from among the rulers of the Federal states and the Constitutional heads of the districts were elected by members of the National Assembly. Parliament elected Sir Edward Mutesa, the King of Buganda as the non-executive head of state in 1963. Each of the monarchs had their own constitutions, land board, revenue collecting board, police force and court system applicable to their respective territories. Parliament could not alter any powers of the Constitution of Buganda without consent of the two-thirds all members of the Lukiiko and for other federal states without consent of two-thirds of voting members. The federal state rulers and the district heads during their tenure of office were exempted from direct personal tax, civil proceedings against them in their personal capacity, compulsory acquisition of their property
While the 1962 Independence Constitution provided varying degrees of federal relationship between the central government and the kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro, Buganda had more autonomy akin to a state within a state. The Buganda Lukiiko had powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government in respect of Kabakaship, status of the Kabaka Ministers such as their powers, obligations, and duties, the public service of Buganda, matters incidental to the Lukiiko and other authorities established by the Constitution of Buganda, taxation matters as agreed to by the government, Buganda Public Holidays and festivals, traditional and customary matters exclusive to Buganda. The fedearal states had their own land boards, the police force and courts. The kingdom of Buganda had the same jurisdiction as the High court of Uganda. The Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court were also the judges of the High Court of Buganda. Of the 82 members of the National Assembly, 21 of them were Buganda representatives.
One common factor was that the king ruled by birth and divine right. According to Justus Mujaju the kings were not answerable to the people, and were the embodiment of state combining executive, legislature, judicial and even spiritual powers. Again, succession from one king to another was usually violent (Justus Mujaju : An
Historical Background in Uganda’s No-Party Democracy 2000).
Dr. Oloka Onyango traces the historical role of Buganda and its implication for the democratic resolution within the broader context of Uganda. in his critique (Oloka Onyango The Question of Buganda in Ugandan Politics). The imperialist policy of indirect rule guaranteed that Buganda remained dominant virtually throughout the colonial epoch. Successive regimes have faced a variety of pressures from the Baganda, who have all along sought a return to the position of pre-eminence enjoyed until 1966. The constitution of 1967 was amended amidst the constitution making debate, on the initiative of the President Museveni to allow for the coronation of Prince Ronald Muwenda Mutebi as the 36th Kabaka in 1993. This dramatically returned the Question of Buganda to the centre stage of Uganda’s polity and garnered consciousness about the monarchy and sub-national ethnicity. Support of the monarchy earned political capital for the Movement because it was the single factor that could secure the alliance of Buganda across virtually all religions, sectoral, class and ideological lines. During the Constituent Assembly (CA), the issue of Buganda and the return of Federo gained prominence and was used asa bargaining chip in the struggle between the multi-partists and the Movement. The NRM promised more express political powers for the Kabaka in return for Buganda’s support for the extension of the NRM system for another five years. However, once it achieved its entrenchment in the constitution, the NRM appeared to have reneged on its tacit agreement with the monarchists. As compensation for the NRM betrayal of the federalists, nothing radical or revolutionary was devised about the land issue of the plight of the peasantry or the character of the developmental monarch that was envisaged. Nevertheless, the constitution, under Art 37 recognises the right to belong, to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, language, tradition and creed. Buganda has restored its Ministries of Constitutionalism, political affairs, mass mobilisation, internal affairs, human rights and local government and the Lukiiko (parliament) into effective operation, despite the fact that the constitution restricts kingdoms to a cultural role. Oloka-Onyango concludes that the restoration of the kingdoms was a lame retreat from reality: reality illustrates that all politics is partisan, and that the process of development is never apolitical.” It is quite clear therefore that the successful moderation between Buganda and Uganda is contingent upon a frank, democratic and non-conflictual discussion of the parameters of a fully recognised political Kabaka.
There are additional problems associated with the institution of the monarchy. Barya in Political Parties, the Movement and the Referendum 2000, points out that the Movement system of government has accentuated and elevated the value of tribe, for there is nothing to compete against it in mobilising Ugandans voluntarily other than religion. Recognising that according to the Constitutional Commission statistics, of the 1334 memorandas received, 654 advocated for a federal system of government, it would be erroneous to ignore this issue and not give it sufficient debate.
3.3 Towards A One-Party Political System
From the mid 1960’s to the mid-eighties, the one-party system became fashionable in Africa. Countries preferred the one-party system for various reasons. However, many leaders did not care to provide a rationale for adopting such a system. Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere was one of the few who gave a philosophical justification for such a system and strongly championed it for a long time. Some of the reasons advanced by Nyerere were (a) political parties represent classes, and since there were no classes in Africa, political parties would end up representing ethnic and clan interests; and (b) post-colonial societies in Africa were faced with such huge challenges that they needed to harness all the resources they could and mobilise all their forces to fight such evils as ignorance, disease and poverty. In his book Freedom and Socialism, Nyerere stated:
With rare exceptions the idea of class is something entirely foreign to Africa. Here, in this continent, the Nationalist Movements are fighting for freedom from foreign domination not from domination by any ruling class of our own. To us “the other party” is the colonial power. In many parts of Africa this struggle has been won; in others it is still going on. But everywhere the people who fight the battle are not former overlords wanting to re-establish a lost authority; they are not a rich mercantile class whose freedom to exploit the masses is being limited by the colonial powers, they are the common people of Africa [Julius Nyerere 1968: Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press].
What is very interesting about Africa is that in economic terms both the countries that championed a one-party system and those that followed a multi-party system fared more or less the same. The crisis of the eighties devastated all their economies, and most of them had to follow the neo-liberal economic scripts and swallow the IMF/World Bank conditionalities.
By the time Milton Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin he decided to turn Uganda into a dejure one-party state. Although Amin denounced Obote for imposing a one-party dictatorship and promised to restore multiparty politics, he soon turned the country into a military dictatorship. He banned all political parties and declared himself a life president. He suspended significant sections of the 1967 constitution, and in a way the Constitution ceased to be the supreme law of Uganda. Parliament lost its law-making powers to the head of state [Legal Notice No.1 of 1971], thus making the President not only the ‘supreme law’ but also the sole law-maker [Oloka-Onyango, 1993].
Amin’s rule was the most despotic and murderous that Uganda (and Africa) had ever seen. At first when he took over he was hailed by Ugandans (especially the Baganda) and praised by Western countries, but once he started committing the atrocities against his own people, as a matter of policy this support waned. Playing on people’s racial instincts, he expelled the Asian from Uganda. In 1978, he embarked on a foreign adventure by invading Tanzania. All this did not help him. In the end he was forced to flee into exile and his regime collapsed as a result of the onslaught by the combined forces of the Tanzanian army and Ugandan patriotic elements.
On coming to power in 1986 Yoweri Museveni promised Ugandans a ‘broad-based, individual merit and inclusive’ government, and he justified this in the interest of national unity, reconciliation, stability and reconstruction. The following arguments have been presented as the rationale for this position:
2.The few years of relative peace in some areas since 1986 and in others since 1990, cannot be taken for granted. There are still people – including some activists of political parties – who would like to take revenge on their real or imaginary enemies;
3.Politics should be inclusive, as opposed to past experience of political parties where those in or seeking power often sought to exclude all save party faithfuls from sharing power – the ‘winner-takes all’ syndrome.
4.In order to put in place development policies which cater for all, there is need for a political system which includes all on the basis of equality [RU 1993:211].
The Movement system partially revived the monarchial system of governance, as means of embracing all political thinking. Although the mandate of the monarchies is restricted to cultural issues, they are legally recognised by the constitution.
While both Ugandans and others were intrigued as to what this would mean in constitutional, political and legal terms, it soon became clear that this ‘no-party system’ was conceived as one of the possible political systems for Uganda. What was not debated was that Uganda needed time to reconcile with itself and to create national unity and cohesion. So much blood had been spilt that people needed time to breathe the air of freedom and to discard the fear of tyranny. What was not expected was that this ‘no-party system’ would be a long-term feature of Uganda’s constitutional order.
It was not surprising therefore that during the debate on the 1995 Constitution, proponents of political pluralism strongly urged for the return to a multiparty system. It was agreed then that a referendum would be held in the year 2000 to decide on whether the country should return to multipartyism, continue with a ‘no-party system’ or adopt any other form of a democratic system. In the referendum held in the year 2000, those who wanted a ‘no-party system’ did win, but what really happened was that the matter was only postponed. The issue has re-emerged once more.
In 1981, Museveni and the legendary 26 went to
the bush and captured power 5 years later. However, there is no comprehensive literature, legendary short stories, poems,
no stirring reminiscence, no inspiring biographies on the Bush War. The only document that came out of the bush war is the 10 Point programme. There is an official silence about the past and the present….a pragmatism that judges everything by results, nothing by principles, as observed by Mamdani in
And fire Does not Always beget Ash : Critical reflection on the NRM 1995.
Kasfir Nelson, in Movement Democracy, Legitimacy and Power, offers some slight insights into the genesis of the Movement. In the midst of fighting, the NRA did not consider broad representation of the Ugandan public an immediate priority. The civilian wing of the NRM, was barely an appendage of the NRA, operating outside the country to provide publicity and collect material assistance. The basis of the “Movement” democracy was inspired by the administrative need to organise Baganda villages in Luwero triangle to supply it with food and recruits. The elections of the choice of officers to the resistance councils were introduced later, in order to give members of the council a role to play in directly choosing their leaders and governing their communities. As the NRA grew in size and expanded its territory, it introduced the Resistance Council to the areas of operation. This also resulted in more effective conducting of military operations. Wapakhabulo in Movement Democracy in Uganda affirms that the RC were indeed introduced for maintenance of law and order, discuss matters of common interest and above all participate in the process of national liberation. On capturing power, Museveni saw the importance of broadening the NRA political appeal in order to legitimise their programme to reform and rejuvenate Ugandan society, hence the birth of Movement democracy.
The political systems question was identified by the Odoki Commission as one of the contentious issues. Although the Commission set the framework of the debate on the issue, the draft was silent on the exact nature of the Movement and on the rules by which it was supposed to be governed in its operations. Oloka Onyango in New Wine or New Bottles, argues that the constitutional issues were so embroiled in the political that the CA became a highly politicised forum. There was acrimonious accusations and counter accusations, with both the Multi-partist and the Moventalists safeguarding their positions and rejecting any suggestion from the competing side without due considerations of the merits of the issue. Instead of making a constitution, the two groups worked out their different expectations in an atmosphere of mutual fear and suspicion (Senkumba NRM, Political Parties and the Demobilisation of Organised Political Forces CBR Working Paper 59) as well as confusion and prevarication (The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution : Achieving Consensus By Law Barya 30). Each group formed a caucus to study the draft constitution and prepare suitable amendments in their interest.
Unfortunately the debate on the political system was based more on emotions, accusations, and counter accusations rather than objective reasoning and was narrow in scope (Senkumba11-15) The two sides were seen as mutually exclusive. The CA provided for the continuation of the Movement system without providing for and constitutionalising its structures, with the Multi-party advocates storming out of the CA.
The debate was carried out with a tacit understanding that Buganda and Western Uganda would support the NRM position. Not sure of the support from Eastern Uganda, and taking Northern Uganda as part of the opposition, the NRM government made a drastic cabinet reshuffle in November 1994 ahead of the CA debate on the controversial issues of political system, federalism and land. (Barya 2000:27). Oloka-Onyango (opcit) further observes that each CA delegate was preoccupied with safeguarding their own interests before those of the nation. They sought to ensure the continuity of their tenure in Parliament and the continuation of the Movement system of the reversion to multi-party politics. Therefore the inclusion of the referendum in the constitution had the effect of postponing debate on the most critical issue affecting the process of governance in Uganda; how to ensure that a balance was achieved between the incorporation of grassroots structures of participation in the process of governance at the local level and the recognition of the right to organised opposition and democratic participation. Instead the CA reaffirmed the monopoly of political power for the Movement.
The US issued a statement decrying the process of using the constitution to preserve monopoly of power indefinitely and continue the prohibition on the right of association and assembly, which was dismissed by Museveni as interference. …It is not for US to decide for Ugandans what is best for them. As aptly concluded by
Barya, the lesson learnt is that
trying to make rules on accessing and managing the state while at the same time holding on to state power was likely to be done in a self-serving manner. It is difficult to see a group in power legislating itself out of power.
Article 70 of the constitution defines the Movement political systems as broad based, inclusive and non-partisan and shall conform to the following principles:
a) participatory democracy
b) democracy, accountability and transparency
c) accessibility to all positions of leadership by all citizens
d) individual merit as a basis for election to political offices
The argument that the movement system of government and the multi-party system are incompatible was enshrined in the constitution under Art 269, which suspends political party activity during the tenure of the movement government.
The Movement Act 7 of 1997, does not define what a Movement is. In other words the Movement is a fluid concept that may mutate into any form to embrace democratic principles as prescribed by parliament, as per S. 29.
S.4 outlines the organs of the Movement, namely,
a) The National Conference
b) The National Executive Committee
c) The Secretariat of the Movement
d) The District, the Municipal, the Sub-county and Town , the Parish and the Village Movement Committees.
As per s.4-5, the National Conference is the highest organ of the of the Movement. It is a body corporate. The National Conference is comprised of the following: The Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson, the National Political Commissar, all members of parliament, all Members of the District Executive Committee, the Chairpersons of all District and Municipal Movement, Sub-county, town council Committees, five members each of the National Women’s Executive Committee, National Youth Council, National Organisation Of Trade Unions, National Union of Disabled persons, the Veteran Association and Police Forces, ten representatives each of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces and the private business sector, three representatives of the Uganda Prisons Service, all Resident District Commissioners and the President of the Republic of Uganda.
The key role of the National Conference is to initiate, formulate and evolve national consensus on key political, economic and social policies (s.6).
The Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson are elected by the National Conference. The Chairperson of the National Conference is the head of the Movement, the Chairperson of the National Executive Committee, as well as the spokesperson of the Movement. He is also responsible for convening the meetings of the National Conference which meets once every two years (s.7-8).
The National Executive Committee (NEC) is comprised of the following (s.10) : The Chairperson and Vice Chairperson, the National Political Commissar, the District Chairperson, one member of Parliament from each District, one third of the District Women Representative, two representatives of the Uganda People Defense Forces, One representative each of the Uganda Police Force, The Uganda Prison Services, the Private business sector, the Veteran Association, persons with disabilities, the Youth and Workers and the President of Uganda. The role of the NEC (s.11) is to deal with policy matters on behalf of the National Conference and is responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Conference.
The Secretariat headed by the National Political Commissar(s.13), is the administrative arm of the Movement (s.15). The National Political Commissar is the Secretary to both the NEC and the National Conference. The Directors of the Movement Secretariat are elected by Chairperson with the approval of NEC.
Every adult Ugandan is a conscripted member of the Movement, by virtue of being deemed a member of the Village Movement Committee (s.26)
The funds of the Movement are derived from the Consolidated fund and grants or donations .
4.5 Judicial Interpretation of the Movement Legal Provisions
Generally, as articulated by Prof. Ssempebwa In the Role of the Court in Constitutional Development, there is a notable lack of judicial preparedness, particularly by the Constitutional Court, for an active role in constitutional development. There exists judicial restraint; a reluctance to embrace the interpretative role of the court in a manner that enhances individual rights of the people, but rather have a conscious effort not to conflict with the Executive on constitutional matters. At times the Constitutional Court had declined to hear some petitions. The effect of the court’s decision in Shiekh Abdul Karim Sentamu (Constn Pet 7/1998), is that a person who wants to enforce their rights need not go to the Constitutional Court because enforcement of rights does not involve interpretation of the constitution. Amidst the above background, the following section focuses on the judicial interpretation of the disputes directly related to the political systems debate.
The CA statute 6 of 1993 and the regulations were unsuccessfully challenged in Rwanyarare & 2 others -vs- Attorney General (Miscellaneous Application No. 85 of 1993), a constitutional petition by the UPC who arguing that the provisions adversely affected the right to free expression because campaigns on the basis of political parties or any other “sectarian” ground were outlawed and criminalized. Additionally the public will be denied the opportunity to hear views except those considered right by government
The Constitutional Court held that the provisions were validly made by the National Resistance Council pursuant to its powers under Legal Notice 1 of 1986. As such Legal Notice was superior to the 1967 Constitution and that rules made by the NRC to adapt the 1967 Constitution to the Legal Notice were valid. It was further held that the rules were temporary and part of an unusual and peculiar political process that would end with the promulgation of the new Constitution. The court expressed hope that at the end of the period, fresh considerations would arise and most likely during the debate of the draft Constitution all thorny and burning issues would be resolved. The net effect of this was to facilitate the elections of Movement candidates to the CA.
In yet another case the referendum to choose and adopt the political system was held
amidst a lot of political and legal acrimony. In Semwogerere and .
Zachary Olum Vs
Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No 6 of 1999) the Petitioners sought a number
of declarations and orders with respect to the constitutionality of the referendum on
political systems and the Referendum and Other Provisions Act No. 2 of 1999.
Particularly, they contested the choice of a “political system” through a referendum or an
election under article 69 of the Constitution is inconsistent with and contravenes articles
20, 21, 29 (1) (a) (b) (d) (e); 38 (2), 70(1) (d), 71(f); 72(1) and 75 of the Constitution.
At the hearing of the petition, the Attorney General raised several objections, amongst which was that the Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction to interprete conflicting provisions in the Constitution such as articles 29 and 269 and to reconcile them. The majority of the Court agreed with the objection. However two of their Lordships dissented arguing that the Constitutional Court has powers to to interpret and harmonise the Constitution, which responsibility could not be abdicated in the vain hope that other authorities will amend the Constitution or harmonise it.
By a majority of three to two the petition was dismissed. The majority view was that the referendum provided for a free and fair contest that enabled both the multiparty and movement system advocates to organise as individuals or groups under referendum committees for the purposes of canvassing for the referendum.
The
two
dissenting
Justices, Justice
Twinomujuni
and Justice
Okello, argued that the critical point was not whether
both sides
had constituted
their national
referendum
committees but whether
the law as it stood provided
both sides equal
opportunity
to constitute their campaign machinery and the national referendum committee.
In their considered opinion, “Political parties are legally
incapable of
participating
in any exercise
to form the referendum
committees and
will remain
so for as
long as
article 269 remains an interim
provision
of our bondage.
The framers of our constitution
could not have
intended
such a monstrous
result.
The referendum and Other Provisions Act, No. 2 of 1999 was also challenged on the ground that it was passed in Parliament without the necessary quorum: in Paul Kawanga Semwogerere & Anor. -vs- Attorney General ( Constitutional Appeal No. 3 of 1999). The Attorney General raised a number of preliminary objections to its hearing on the merits. The Constitutional Court upheld the objections and dismissed the Petition. The Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the ruling of the Constitutional Court and ordered that the Petitioners be heard on the merits in Constitutional Appeal no. 1 of 2000. The petition was eventually heard by the Constitutional Court. In a unanimous judgment, it was declared that the Referendum and Other Provisions Act, 1999 was passed in a manner inconsistent with articles 88 and 89 of the Constitution and was therefore null and void. The Court held that the Referendum and Other Provisions Act , 1992 was enacted in Parliament without a quorum. The Court went beyond the issues originally framed for Court’s determination and held that the voice voting method applied in Parliament contravenes article 89(1) of the Constitution.
Amidst the hearing to make a pre-emptively enacted another referendum law before the challenged law was declared null and void. The New Referendum Law was presented to Parliament on June 7th 2000, and within two hours debated, read three times and passed into law. Under S. 29 of the Act, all actions taken or purported to be taken in good faith for purposes of the referendum required to be held under article 271 of the Constitution but before publication of the Act in the gazette were deemed to have been taken or made under the Act.
The new law was in substance and form a replica of the old one. The new referendum law was swiftly challenged by two petitions on ground of the retrospective character of Act 9 of 2000, and the non observance of the procedures. Additionally, the petition by James Rwanyarare and Badru Wegulo Petition No. 4 of 2000 sought an interim order to prohibit the holding of the referendum until the final disposal of case. However, it was never set for hearing until the referendum was completed. The petition was eventually dismissed in November, 2000. In their judgment their Lordship held inter alia that:
a) The enactment of Act 9 of 2000 did not contravene article 79(1) and (3) of the Constitution. Good governance required that since Act No. 2 of 1999 covering referendum in general was being challenged in Court, a specific Act had to be enacted for the holding of a referendum on political systems within the time limits set by the Constitution.
b) The enactment of Act 9 of 2000 did not contravene article 92 of the Constitution since no decision of the Constitutional court or Supreme Court was changed.
c) Sections 2 and 29 of Act 9 of 2000 in so far as they act retrospectively did not contravene article 79(1) and (3) on good governance. Indeed the sections were made in the interests of good governance.
4.6 Academic Debate on the Movement System
Academics have engaged Movement System with a fascination, that has resulted in comprehensive scrutiny of the various facets of the issue. There is a wealthy of publications. However, this section has only reviewed those debate that focus on the political system debate.
John Senkumba in NRM, Political Parties and the Demobilisation of Organised Political Forces CBR Working Paper 59, 2000 observes that despite the NRM’s 1996 presidential and Parliamentary electoral victory the Movement is experiencing not only waning legitimacy, but also a weakening commitment to any ideological cause. There is growing disillusionment to the extent that the NRM no longer wields efficient coercive or consensual power. After the initial transition 4 years, the NRM, ceased to be a genuinely transition arrangement, and in effect became a controlled, directed and guided transition were the issues of debate were unclear and poorly articulated by and were directed by the NRM. Defining democracy as a system characterised by a reasonable degree of legitimacy and accountability, representative groups no longer influence policy in any significant manner nor act to reinforce the citizen’s participation and guarantee the exercise of civil rights but use threat to influence political choices. Ultimately, the NRM’s overall concern is to simply win elections at whatever costs and not to open up space to enable Ugandan to choose between different options. There is more reliance on coercive state organs to intimidate and harass those who advocate for federalism and multi-partism.
Likewise, Nelson Kasfir observes that although the structures of the Movement are in place, both the enthusiasm and the promise of fundamental change have largely faded. During political crises the leaders of the NRM often use their control over movement democracy as a weapon to strengthen their hold unto power. The refusal to permit party activity is hollow based on considerations of power than on democratic doctrine.
Barya in Political Parties, the Movement and the Referendum argues that both the political party arrangements and the so called Movement are not systems but just electoral mechanisms or means of acquiring or retaining state power. Neither are the two mutually exclusive. It is possible for participatory democracy based on local councils or similar structures to be practices under a multi-party arrangement as long as their functions and tenures are clearly spelt out. Political parties are not solely responsible for the conflictual and turbulent past of Uganda. Their weaknesses represent those of the country as a whole. The essence of political parties is to provide alternative visions of how to manage society. The referendum cannot and has indeed failed to create national unity, consensus nor heal old wounds. This can only be resolved in a political process in which all political parties voluntarily participate on an equal basis. The contribution of the Movement can be harnessed through a pluralistic multi-party framework that avoids a winner takes all situation. In conclusion, whereas the Movement had historical relevance at its inception, its continuation is no longer tenable.
In yet another critique, John-Jean Barya in The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution : Achieving Consensus By Law CBR paper 57, 2000), further observes that with all institutions of government virtually turned into the arms of the NRM, a non-NRM government would find it virtually impossible to inherit the loyalty of the various NRM organs and its political functionaries.
Oloka-Onyango in New Wine or New Bottles? Movement Politics and One-partism in Uganda, argues that the phenomenon of Movement politics in Uganda is neither novel nor an exemplary expression of the democratic ideal. There is an overlap between the state and the Movement system, making questionable whether it is a sustainable and democratic system which allows for the complete participation of all the people of Uganda. A key element in any system of democratic governance is the right to organise in an expression of disagreement with the status quo. Although initially Museveni’s greatest contribution was to signal a move away from single party monopoly to power sharing, over the years he has performed a volte face, culminating in the 1995 Constitution and sealed with the Movement Act. The Movement is a single party in all but name which is supported by the state funding. The consequence of the movement election is to make organised opposition illegal and the practice of patronage and money is undermining the access to positions of responsibility by progressive forces, hence turning politics into a business. He prophesises that as is the case with any form of government where the domination of a father-like figure is so clear, it is simply a matter of time before the house of cards collapses.
5.0 MISSION FINDINGS
This Chapter is a catalogue of the opinions of respondents as presented to the Fact-finding Mission. It represents a spectrum of views on the political systems debate.
The 1995 Constitution of Uganda contains several ‘progressive provisions’ such as a strong Bill of Rights with increased capacities for enforcement, and various provisions relating to popular representation and restriction on the arbitrary exercise of executive power. The above notwithstanding, entrenched in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda is the “no-party” Movement system of government, based on personal merit rather than on organised political action. The proponents of the multiparty political system in Uganda argue that the Movement system is detrimental to democracy and the protection of fundamental civil and political rights. Thus, the restriction of political parties under Article 269 of the Constitution has implications for the fundamental human rights to freedom of assembly, association, and expression. On the other hand, the proponents of the Movement system argue that it has the constitutional right and mandate of the people of Uganda as determined by the 2000 Referendum on Political Systems. This controversy dominated the Presidential campaign to such an extent that the President established a Constitution Review Commission.
The Mission was appreciated by the majority of respondents, who agreed that the political system is so central to the stability of Uganda, that the situation should not be allowed to become conflictual, with no mechanism for peaceful dialogue. A minority denied the possibility of any impending crisis, but maintained that what was at stake was an unresolved debate.
Many respondents traced the origin of the controversy on the issues of governance to the vested interests of the crafters of the constitution who were also prospective beneficiaries. Furthermore, the Constitution of 1995 was made to appease different interests groups, and therefore contains some inconsistencies.
Uganda missed a prime opportunity to use the Political Parties and Organisation Bill (POB) to initiate a programme for transition. The above notwithstanding, the level of conflict is superficial, for both the Movement and Opposition are agreed on the need for opening up. The question is not whether or not to open up, but when to do so. Most respondents anticipated the expansion of political space in 2004. The
media have quoted the President as intimating that 2004 would be the right time. It is anticipated that the 2006 elections will be held under a system of multipartyism.
Despite the realisation for change, there is no consensus on how to manage that change, or when the change should begin, or what kind of liberalisation is envisaged, in view of the fact that there are various models of multipartyism.
Even where the core Movement admits the need to change, it wants the changes as near to 2006 as possible. On the other hand, the multipartyists and the liberal Movementists want a long transition period in order to put in place the legal and institutional framework required for a genuinely democratic process. Many are of the opinion that delayed liberalisation would definitely disadvantage the multipartyists, but hoped that they would not boycott the elections given the Movement’s history of non-compromise.
In the discussion, there were basically two positions, those in favour of political
liberalisation
and those against it. The following is a synopsis of the contrasting viewpoints.
According to those who do not favour an immediate expansion of political space, the following are the main arguments.
a) The question of governance up to 2006 was settled by the Referendum of 2000, which represents the decision of all Ugandans. The President has no power to declare multipartyism as argued by a section of Ugandans. The referendum is the only constitutional framework through which to change the political system. Political liberalisation before 2006 was not only unconstitutional but would also set a very bad precedent. Whatever the flaws of the referendum, it is very important to respect its verdict as the verdict of the people of Uganda who exercised their right to vote.
b) Therefore, the unresolved question is what happens after 2006. The Movement argues that it is not mandatory to hold another referendum but that Parliament can move a motion to have a subsequent referendum. Should there be no such motion, the Movement system of governance shall continue.
c) Additionally, political parties are associated with political anarchy. From 1880, Uganda witnessed 2 decades of religious wars based on parties: originally the traditionalists and Moslems against western religion and thereafter the Protestants against the Catholics. There was also an oppressive system that put religion in a hierarchical structure: a) Protestants, b) Catholics, c) Muslims and d) Traditionalists in that order. It is the experience of multipartyism that has bred sectarianism in Uganda. Hence the assertion that Uganda is not coming to multipartyism, but is running away from it.
d) It is premature to discuss change, for there is no reason and scientific measure for why there should be change. Furthermore, the Movement commands the support of the people, because they associate development with the Movement. Accordingly, the Movement boasts of the following achievements:
- Impressive economic growth calculated at 6-7% and currently close to 5%.
- In 1992, 56% of the people were living below a dollar a day compared to 35% in the year 2002.
- There is a sectoral approach to issues.
- Improved peace and security with the exception of the war in the North and in Bundibugyo.
- Universal Primary Education is a pillar of success.
- Decentralisation has enhanced the people’s ability to influence everyday life situations.
- Liberalisation of the coffee industry.
- A vibrant civil society, including the Churches and other religious institutions.
- A free and critical press with 77 radio stations.
- An independent Judiciary
-
There are many Ugandan returnees, including those of Asian origin.
- The creation of a classless society.
- Local Council (LC) system based on residence is a major contributor in unifying Uganda.
- Increased participatory decision-making under the LC system. The people elect their leaders and have the ability to change them.
- The Movement has downplayed religion and ethnicity.
-
It has created space for women’s emancipation.
-
Parliament now has the ability to have its voice heard,
for example, the censuring of two Cabinet Ministers and the removal of the Vice President from the Ministry of Agriculture.
- There has been a marked decrease in new HIV infections.
- The Movement has ably professionalised the military.
- The Movement has revived the Kingdoms in Uganda.
e)
The Movement quotes Article 73 of the Constitution to argue that Parliament is obliged to put in place laws that protect the Movement from the non-interference of political parties. Accordingly, the two systems cannot operate side by side. It asserts that it is not the responsibility of the Movement to nurture political parties:
“I cannot organise my
opposition…My work is to build the Movement.”
a)
Since the 2000 Referendum did not provide for the Movement to continue forever, it is prudent to prepare the country for eventual change, rather than letting change manage the Movement. Uganda should never again be subjected to political confusion. In the past Uganda has suffered from bad leadership and the failure to recognise the need for peaceful change. Therefore, in the interest of the
country, there is a need to let the dissenting voices be heard and go to the people while the Movement consolidates itself as a party.
b)
The Movement will no longer be tenable after 2006. Conditions that obtained and dictated the Movement have changed. The solution is not to return to multipartyism before 2006, but to prepare for the eventuality in order to avoid an ad-hoc transition.
c)
Liberalisation
has the advantage of mitigating any possible collision and the provocation of unnecessary tension.
The protest vote is growing. The
intelligentsia, the middle class and the urban populace are no longer outrightly pro-Movement, as demonstrated by the fact that the Movement lost the recent local government and parliamentary elections in many urban centres. The natural evolution would be towards political openness.
d)
The current status of political parties, which is described as clinically dead, does not and has not in the past posed any serious threat to the Movement system of government. Even during the Presidential Elections it was easier to market the Reform Agenda than the parties. Additionally, the freeing of the political parties will strengthen the Movement.
The Reformist group will be integrated either back into the Movement or into the parties. The teaming up of the dissenting voices enhances the strength of the Reformist group. Furthermore, a multiplicity of parties has always been an advantage to the incumbent government.
e)
Uganda is moving from an extreme position of mis-governance and bad governance to a settled state. The Movement was originally introduced as a transitional system. It was hoped that the President would introduce a new constitution and provide for pluralism. It was not necessary to entrench the Movement in the Constitution. The Movement is appreciated as an
African solution to a difficult situation, but we must move on.
f)
The Movement was born out of guerrilla warfare. A war situation does not go well with a democratic process. The vestiges of the revolution are still alive with the government of the day, yet many are not consistent with democracy. For example, during war, decisions are made by a few people and explained to others. Dissent within the Movement was always internal with no room for public debate.
g)
The system is beginning to show the common weaknesses of a one-party state, such as arrogance, intolerance, lack of debate and rampant corruption. According to Transparent International, Uganda is the 3rd most corrupt country in the world. Although top government officials are amassing wealth from the state coffers, the President has hardly sacked anyone for corruption. Two of the Ministers who
were censured by the 6th Parliament were reinstated as Ministers without much protest, which raised doubts over the political will to firmly tackle corruption.
It is equally difficult to control Parliament because of the lack of a Whip
.
h) There is no fundamental reason why multipartyism is resisted. The President’s argument that “Uganda is not mature enough to run multiparty democracy” is abuse to Ugandans’ intelligence. Although xenophobia is rampant, it can be mitigated through a regulatory framework.
i) The argument that Multiparties are sectarian has been overtaken by time. Historically, both the UPC and the DP were nationalist parties. Again, the events of 1980, dictated by the resistance against the UPC, resulted in alliances that strengthened the DP, such that it is no longer an outright Catholic Party. Again the co-operation of the parties is illustrated by the fact that during the past Mayoral elections for Kampala City Council, DP supported two consecutive candidates, both of whom were non-Catholic. Further, pragmatically it is no longer possible for any party to organise exclusively along ethnic and religious lines. Contemporary new issues such as unemployment, HIV, gender balancing and internal displacement have emerged.
j) Conversely, for the Movement to show that it has succeeded in its original stated objectives, it must show that the religious/ethnic divide has withered during its tenure of office. Ethnicity and tribalism have persisted and are prevalent in Uganda. A case in point is the case of Kibaale District in which the legally elected LC5 who was a Mukiga by tribe was forced by the local people of the area, (predominantly Banyoro) to forfeit his seat in favour of a fellow Munyoro; a decision that subsequently earned the full sanction by Government. There is also prevalent corruption, favoritism, nepotism and ethnicity exercised by the “ruling tribe” in the country.
k) The benefits of economic development have not been equally shared. Sixty-seven percent of the population in the North (Gulu, Kitgum, West Nile, Karamoja) live below the poverty line. The economy has created losers and winners. There is a growing group of impoverished Ugandans and a closely knit clique of very rich Ugandans. The privatisation process of the parastatals, for which the taxpayers had paid their monies, was badly managed and thus largely benefited individuals, most of whom are in the current political leadership. Although institutions have been put in place, Uganda is not tackling corruption with enough enthusiasm. Privatisation as a solution to corruption has not focused on the issue of good governance. Besides, the rate of population growth at 7.1% per annum and an expected 54 million people by the year 2025 is a challenge for economic development.
l) Despite the illusion of peace, Uganda has exported wars and conflicts to neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Rwanda and the DRC. It also ranks high among countries with a large population of internally displaced communities.
m) The electoral process is beginning to show localised rigging. There is growing fear of the visible arm of the army in determining who wins elections. This has reached such prominent levels that there is a Select Committee on election malpractice, with particular focus on violence by state organs.
n)
Presently, many tenets of the Movement, namely, inclusiveness, broad-basedness, individual merit, non-sponsoring of candidates are undermined in practice, as illustrated here-below:
·
Inclusiveness : Inclusiveness infers that all Ugandans belong to the
same political system, with no need to sponsor candidates.
In reality, the Movement is no longer homogeneous. Whether by default or by design it is clear that an opposition now exists. Both the Multipartyists and the Movement sponsored candidates. The President has also actively campaigned for Movement candidates.
Although all MPs are allegedly elected under the Movement system, some have refused to attend Movement meetings. People are saying “We do not belong… even the Movement has identified people who do not belong. In effect it has become exclusionary...
If I no longer belong and you also accept that I don’t, are you realistic to make me wait for 2004. Why can’t I start looking for where to belong.”
·
Broad-based:
During and after the campaigns, multipartyists were excluded in the allocation of positions.
·
Individual Merit
: This is a piece of legal fiction, which is highly controversial. It infers personal ability and not political subscription. It has prevented people from associating, yet political programmes are social programmes for a common good. It has resulted in disorganising the people into selfish individuals.
It is therefore concluded that the Movement has evolved from a system to a party -
it has a leadership structure with a conscripted membership that goes down to the grassroots. The Movement Act provides that a Local Council Chairperson is automatically a Chairperson of the Movement and all persons aged 18 years and above are members of the Movement. It also has a Secretariat which is funded from the Consolidated Fund.
This is a contradiction because Article 75 prohibits a one party state.
The Movement denies that it is a political party since it does not charge fees or have branches.
The promised fundamental change under the NRM 10 Point Programme has been replaced by the slogan “NO CHANGE.” Denying the people the right to choose where to belong is inherently undemocratic. In view of the above, opening up to change is a matter of taking cognizance of the de facto situation and the practice of the day, which in effect has not disrupted the Movement system of governance. In other words, the totality of the recognition of the practice constitutes the first step towards political liberalisation.
Cognizant of the privileged position of the Movement - it is fused into the state, funded by the government and has impeccable achievements.
The question that arises then is - what are the fears of the Movement against expansion of the political space to a principled contestation?
This section provides a critique of the limitations of Article 269 on the status and role of political parties in Uganda.
“Political Parties were not supposed to die, but were given breathing space in the freezer.”
The ingenuity and sophistication of Article 269 of the Constitution is that a party cannot genuinely behave like a party, because it cannot mobilise its membership nor hold delegates’ meetings. Parties have to wait for members to go to the headquarters, all of which are situated in Kampala. Membership is an extremely critical factor because a party acts on behalf of its membership. Neither is it possible for parties to strengthen their national outlook without access to the rural areas. This has bred criticism by the Movement that political parties are not credible organisations because they are purely urban based, and represent narrow interests. Political parties are in detention or buried, for most activities that political parties need to engage in are unconstitutional. The one available option is working through the print and electronic media. However, the political parties have not utilised this avenue very effectively. They can have publications that articulate their democratisation programme and they can establish radio stations. It is not sufficient for political parties to claim that they cannot do so, without trying. Any restriction of the act of peaceful political speech is unquestionably undemocratic.
Political parties are like dinosaurs: an extinct species which has been caught up in a historical time warp. They have failed to develop an ideological basis for mobilisation. Neither do they have a pragmatic timetable of how to prepare themselves for the transition. They have failed to provide an alternative vision.
There is no internal democracy within political parties. The leadership of the current political parties has been in office for much longer than the leadership of the Movement. On the flip side of the coin, the banning of political party activities makes them impotent to organise themselves and rejuvenate to suit contemporary situations. Any change of office is suicidal as it is not possible to replace the leadership, and would create a vacuum in leadership which would ultimately lead to the demise of the party. Other queries raised were whether political parties could guarantee gender representation as is the case with the Movement.
There was unanimous acclaim about President Museveni’s political astuteness. He was described as a very intelligent and charismatic man, who has made a tremendous contribution to the country. He is the stronghold of the Movement system. Without him, the Movement cannot maintain its current shape. Many saw him as the only person who has the stature to bring change, capable of assuming the role of a Nelson Mandela or a Julius Nyerere.
Simultaneously, President Museveni’s impeccable military track record was acknowledged. He trained in FRELIMO, was a UPC Youth winger, started Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) and has been fighting since then. While he has to rule as a civilian, naturally the military in him is still prominent, making him at times uncompromising and commandeering.
Although compared to the 1967 Constitution, the 1995 Constitution curbs presidential powers, in practice, the President wields considerable power over Parliament.
For instance, Parliament has continuously approved a Cabinet twice as big as provided by the Constitution. Secondly, the approval of presidential appointments is done perfunctorily. Parliament barely objected to the re-appointment of censured Ministers. Third, the UCB was sold against the advice of Parliament with no organised action in protest. Fourth, the POB was discussed afresh because of a presidential veto.
At the end of the day, there is limited separation of powers to check the powers of the President.
While there had been judicial attempts to review and develop the constitution in
Semwogere’s case in which court subjected parliamentary proceedings to judicial scrutiny and castigated the vocal (voice) method of determining a majority vote, this was frustrated by a subsequent constitutional amendment by parliament.
As a result, parliament reversed the judicial decision thus jeopardising the independence of the judiciary with regard to constitutional development. Likewise, an attempt by parliament to move a private member’s vote to consolidate the separation of powers by removing members of cabinet from parliament suffered the same fate. Government whipped its majority in parliament to defeat it. This is an indicator that any
legislative reforms, that are not in the interest of the Executive, are unlikely to succeed. In summation, the following were identified as challenges of parliament within the movement system of governance: The individual merit system is prone to executive influence over parliament, the procedures of Parliament with regard to open voting cannot guarantee objectivity; there is a laisser-faire attitude to the veting of
appointments, and having ministers as members of Parliament erodes the separation of powers.
Similarly, the President has made overt public statements calling the judiciary bankrupt and threatening to sack them. This is a blatant interferance with the independence of the judiciary. The above therefore reflects the serious shortcomings in operationalising the constitution due to individual and sectional selfish interests.
In conclusion, The figure of President Museveni is a prominent feature in the current politics of Uganda. “Museveni is the embodiment of the state,” such that no meaningful discussion can be made without reference to him as an individual. To circumvent the preoccupation with Museveni, there is a need to build sound institutions that uphold democracy and a constitutional culture rather than relying on a “great president.”
Donors are important stakeholders in the review process because over 51% of the budget is donor supported. This is probably the highest proportion in Africa. The donors have a Post Referendum Support Group/Democratisation Group that has been in charge of monitoring the democratisation process, and this is co-ordinated by the Irish Ambassador. There is a strong perception that donors have used the carrot with the Movement rather than the stick, on account of the existing stability and the records of economic growth. They are equally criticised for spoon-feeding a one party state and massaging by providing such enormous support for the budget. Given that both the 6th and the 7th Parliament had substantially devoted their energies to enacting laws in the interest of multi-national institutions, and large resources have been provided by the donor countries to strengthen the Commercial sector, the donors are more inclined to render strong support to President Museveni.
Additionally, foreign countries such as Britain, the USA and Libya continue to shower praises on the President, irrespective of his views on democracy. This adversely encourages him to continue maintaining the status quo. For example President Gaddafi of Libya is quoted to have said that “revolutionaries do not easily give up power.”
Although there is a spectrum of opinions on political issues in Uganda, it is unanimously agreed among the donor community that they should not prescribe any system of governance to Uganda, as this is a decision to be made by Ugandans. It was strongly argued that a more prominent role by donors would be counter-productive and liable to strong resistance from either side, as was the case with donor press release on the Political Parties Bill. As a result, donors have taken a cautious approach not to work through the media, but through a consultative process with various stakeholders as development partners. They have sponsored seminars for political leaders, civic groups and supported the CRC. For example, the CRC has undertaken study tours to the U.K, Ireland and South Africa, among others. Donors as a whole are impressed with the performance of President Museveni but are watching the situation up to 2006. They are equally cautious that pegging change of the political system on conditionalities would not yield a lasting solution and would hurt innocent Ugandans.
The survey revealed that there remained several issues of concern to the Ugandan people, ranging from the scourge of militarism, to the debate about federalism and the status of elections in the country.
The NRM originally started by waging a military struggle and the first institution created was the Peoples’ Revolutionary Army. With its marriage to the political struggle it became a liberation movement. Given the history of the military struggle, the army is “part of everything.” There is no clear divide between the army and politics. The army is also at the core of the electoral and political system and is also represented in Parliament. Likewise the Police have been militarised in maintaining law and order. More profound is the fact that the government is a hybrid of the military and civil society. The army is the institution from which the President and the government hail.
Given that the current army was a liberation army, it is partisan and owes allegiance to Museveni as its leader, who happens to be the President of the Republic. It is capable of revolting against another President. For example, during the presidential elections, Army Generals declared their allegiance to President Museveni, although both presidential candidates were “historical” members of the Movement. This raises a serious question: Can the army be controlled by or be loyal to a non-historical member of the Movement?
The politicisation of the army is defended/reasoned on the following grounds:
a) The Army is officially politicised to respect the constitution and protect the people of Uganda. It is also groomed into a monolithic and nationalist army. It is politically more aware than civilians.
b) It is the political parties that involve the army in politics, because every coup in Uganda has been against a political party. In any case, there is no army in the world which is not politicised.
c) The army has had a central role in politics during the Movement government because it is the same army that took over power and still maintains the ideology and leadership of the NRA, the guerrilla military wing of the NRM. Thus the army has to oversee the achievements ushered in by the Movement.
d) The army should play a central role because all dictators who were terrorising Ugandans are still alive.
e) Historically, the world over, armies have occupied centre stage in the politics of the countries which have gone through revolutions. Therefore the issue at stake is not whether or not the army should be involved in politics, but how it should play its role and how it should be managed.
Furthermore, the High Command is still very critical. Issues of the Congo, Sudan and Rwanda, are catalogued as issues of security, and are thus outside the purview of Parliament. For example, Parliament was only consulted one year after Uganda’s engagement in the Congo. Debate is silenced under the guise of security.
The army consumes 115 billion shillings, constituting about 18-19% of the country’s budget, compared to 8 billion shillings spent on agriculture. Military expenditure comprised 2.4% of GDP in 1999-2000. It is currently at 2.1%, which is still high. However, the Auditor General cannot audit the accounts of UPDF. Neither is the Defence budget scrutinised by the Public Accounts Committee since a big percentage of it is ‘classified’.
Uganda has had a series of armies and armed struggle groups, for example:
- The West Nile Bank Front (WNBF),
- The Rescue Front (URF)
- The Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA)
- The Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA)
- The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
None of these armies have surrendered their arms. Neither have they been integrated into the national army, or adequate resettlement packages given to them. The only form of work these groups are conversant with is of a military nature. This is a situation only Museveni, as a military leader, is capable of controlling. Under civilian rule these groups will bargain and seek leverage as Ugandans. This is an issue which must be handled democratically, not militaristically, and warrants sufficient time and preparation to mitigate the possibility of a military take-over.
Uganda has a history of settling political issues militaristically. It has had nine Presidents. Apart from the first President, Sir Edward Mutesa II (1963 to 1966) and Yoweri Museveni (from 1996 to date) the Ugandan Presidents have captured power or were placed in power by extra constitutional means or through the massive rigging of votes as in the case of the Obote II government in December 1980.
The militaristic situation and the gun culture in Uganda are explosive. In addition to the army, there is the Local Defence Unit (LDU), a largely militarised population having received military training in military school; a reserve army, operating as military officers and even conducting arrests; the police; commercial security organs (all armed with assault weapons and not pistols); and the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). In addition, ordinary criminals and various warlords are heavily armed. Because of this militaristic logic, by October 1986 civil war was back in Uganda. There is serious internal displacement of persons. The war in Acholi has persisted for 16 years and a majority of the people lives in protected camps. Furthermore, war has since spread to the north, east and west and beyond the borders to the Congo and Rwanda.
Despite the human rights violations committed by some of the ungazetted security agencies such as the Kalangala Action Plan (KAP) and despite the fact that some top security officials have categorically denied the legality of the KAP, the organisation is still operational and claims that its activities are sanctioned by the President. However, the government has not taken any measures to restrain or punish them. Furthermore, the Constitution legitimises armed rebellion in defence of the constitution, as per Articles 3(4), (5) and (6).
Along these lines, the Government has conducted military and political training known as Mchaka Mchaka, which has both supporters and detractors.
a) It has professionalised the army.
b) It has provided political education for the citizens about the history of the country, its problems and possible solutions.
c) It demystified the gun. Consequently, people no longer fear the army.
d) It developed a comradeship among the people by enabling them to talk to each other frankly and to diffuse political, ethnic and religious differences.
a) The political education by the government has distorted the history of Uganda.
b) It is a combination of indoctrination and military training. Though purported to teach the history of Uganda, it essentially demonises political parties and presents the Movement as the only answer to Uganda’s problems.
c) The claim that the people have been politicised and therefore not afraid of the army is elusive, because that fear still persists.
It is speculated that the High Command may sponsor a civilian under its control, or one of them may turn into a civilian. Currently the Movement is not prepared to lose the next elections and will use every means available to assure itself of victory.
Others anticipate that there shall be no succession, as the President may seek a third term. This is a controversial issue. It is suspected that the President will use the Constitution Review Commission (CRC), to either extend his term under the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution, or run for another term under a changed constitution that introduces multipartyism. The CRC was deliberately starved of funding, because the longer the CRC takes, the better the Movement’s chances, as the time for levelling the playing field for other political actors becomes more constricted. This would guarantee the return of the Movement as a party, with Museveni as its Chairperson.
Others argue that Museveni would not run again because it would put asunder his political achievements as an African statesman.
Certainly, President Museveni has assured the donor community and close circles that he does not want to run in 2006. However, people are mindful that decisions come from individuals, who often do what they want.
It was warned that
it takes a remarkable person to know that a government is bigger than the individual and not stand outside the constitutional term limit, even when the country begs you to and assures you that it needs you…and that it cannot survive without you.
One of the problems is defining the debate within the broader context of the development of Uganda. This is exacerbated by the poor culture of political tolerance, which breeds the lack of constructive debate. “There is no Saint in Uganda…Whoever speaks what you want to hear is
objective”
Further still, the debate on political systems has been distorted. Despite the expenditure of shillings 13.5 billion on the Referendum, the political question remains unresolved and agitation for the expansion of political space continues to flare.
The referendum debate shifted focus from the discussion of the pros and cons of political systems to “whether to vote or to boycott the referendum.” As a result, there was neither consensus nor compromise. A meaningful referendum would have been promoted by the removal of the restrictions on political parties before conducting the
same.
The mode of the current debate is emotional and many speak politically for the attention of the press. A lot of venom has been unleashed. The debate is too confrontational to yield any meaningful result. It is a show of might. The Movement accuses the multipartyists of being simplistic and one track minded, always complaining that the referendum was rigged and that the Movement manipulated the Constituent Assembly (CA). Likewise, the multipartyists accuse the Movement of being legalistic and using a manipulated Constitution to entrench itself and its majority in Parliament to push through the views of the President without any compromise.
Despite the existence of public debate, there continues to be an impatience of the powers that be with discussions about pluralism. The debate is thus characterised by labelling and polarising the discussion : you are either for us or against us. Furthermore, there is an adamant refusal by the Movement to listen to dissenting political views, as accentuated by the enactment of the Political Organisations Act (POA), with stringent restrictions on the operations of political parties. As such, the POA is a law made in bad faith and a major obstacle to democracy.
To make matters worse, President Museveni has limited the discussion to “ the right forum, at the right time.” There are fears of reprisals against Movement politicians who speak out against the system. Indeed, debates and dialogue are now left to other groups of people such as the academicians. Even in such fora, there is a fear that people are being monitored. Consequently, public debates are largely attended by students and to a small extent by civil society.
Furthermore, there is a multitude of meanings attached to words such that there is no sound foundation for a constructive discussion. For example, multipartyism, democracy and good governance are used inter-changeably and yet they have different meanings and motives. The word multipartyist has gained derogatory as well as positive connotations such as those of rebel, traitor, anarchist, courageous, progressive to mention but a few. Likewise, the Movement argues that good governance and peace demand the restriction on parties, while multipartyists argue that the restriction is anti-democratic. Both camps are using the same words for different reasons.
There is an obvious lack of societal consensus on the political future of Uganda. Even within the Movement there are different visions. Given Uganda’s history of terror and the limited experience of democratic governance within the country, it is important to generate a consensus on what shall ultimately enhance peace and security and what constitutes a democratic state. It was strongly argued that Uganda is so polarised that there is need for negotiation and compromise. Ugandans are a fundamentalist society…they do not want you to be in the middle… you need to declare your side and then sit together… otherwise you are not one of them.
Is there a possibility of a person/institution building consensus, apart from the President? A related question is whether there is a neutral anchor on which transformation can be built. Unlike Kenya and Tanzania who had Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere as the ‘Father’ of the Nation respectively, Uganda has had no such figure that can rally people together. What are the options? Who can uphold the fundamental values of Uganda as a democratic state? The above has been exacerbated by the fact that Uganda is not a homogeneous country. It has no national language. Although English is the official language, it is not spoken by all sectors of society. Kingdoms still exist and many people identify themselves in relation to their tribe and not as Ugandans. Additionally, ethnic clashes and religious tensions are still in existence.
5.9.6.
Making The Constitution Reflect
the
Aspirations of The
People
During the consultations of the CRC, there was more spontaneous and passionate contributions about welfare issues: poverty, the inability to market produce and the burden of taxation. The fact that the CRC received substantial views about issues of economic welfare compared to the “constitutional” ones is affirmation of several factors following. First, that economic rights are so central to the political development of the country that the two are indivisible. Any debate on political development in Uganda in isolation of the economic situation would be futile for failing to respond to the aspirations and needs of the majority of Ugandans. Consequently, economic issues should be at the core of constitutional discussions. Second, it is a strong indication of the people urge to express their needs and frustrations. Ostensibly, there is limited opportunity and a dearth of a democratic and institutional framework through which they can express their opinions.
I have a vision of our political organisation with manifestos built around social issues. Perhaps then pluralism would be better appreciated by the people than in a situation where the people see us leaders as mere power seekers.
Good will and positive intent matter as much as policy and legislation. Where there is no real intent to implement the constitution, it becomes a mere piece of paper. In other words, it is not the lack of a constitution or the existence of a bad constitution that creates the problem. Rather, the problem is the leaders’ propensity to manipulate the law to their advantage.
There are several review processes. For example, there is the CRC and the Think Tank of the Movement Secretariat, and there are the new groupings within Parliament. These initiatives are operating independently of one another and serve to send out conflicting signals.
There is considerable doubt as to whether the CRC is a genuine attempt at constitutional development, or merely an exercise in public relations, given that it was established in the heat of the Presidential campaigns. Some had judged the CRC process as a waste of time, since there is no guarantee that its recommendations shall be adopted and implemented. Drawing analogy from the previous Commission of Inquiries, whose reports were not published in full, there was apprehension over the outcome of the CRC. The Commission’s report is non-binding. It only serves as recommendations to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and eventually the Movement-dominated Cabinet. Others think that it is a waste of resources since the political system issue could have been resolved by the POB, the scrapping of the Movement Act and the deletion of Art 269 from the constitution. The fact that the composition of the CRC is biased in favour of the Movement, with membership primarily constituted of Movement protagonists, with no political party representative, is further decried. There is also concern that the CRC was initially starved of funds as a deliberate attempt to delay the completion of its task or to deny meaningful dialogue on the issues of controversy. It is contended that the ultimate aim of the CRC is to change the constitution to allow multipartyism, and thereupon legitimise Museveni’s continuation in power. Nonetheless, the CRC is appreciated by some as the last opportunity to iron out the contradictions within the Constitution, in a participatory manner. The credibility of the CRC’s Chairperson has been lauded.
In his keynote address at the Dissemination Workshop : The Constitutional Review Process in Uganda,
Professor Ssempebwa enumerated the several challenges faced by the CRC. Particularly, the CRC was not moving at the desired speed due to a lack of timely and adequate facilitation.
It has also faced pressure to have minimum consultations on the basis that the CRC is constituted by knowledgeable technocrats who can readily identify the flaw and make suitable recommendations. However, the CRC
has opted to have wide consultations in order for the review to earn the public trust and confidence, it is imperative for it to be transparent and participatory by involving all Ugandans in the exercise. The broad scope of the terms of reference and the inter-linkages of the constitutional provisions has necessitated a review of the whole constitution, and not merely the provisions outlined in the terms of reference.
Although the CRC initially intended to carry out an elaborate civic education programme, this was frustrated by the lack of requisite facilitation. As a result, the CRC co-opted civil society organizations to do the sensitisation, with the CRC synchronising and closely monitoring the activities of the working partners.
In December 15th –19th 2001, the National Executive Committee of the Movement (NEC) met and appointed a 22 person Committee (herein referred to as the “Think Tank”) representing ethnic, racial, religious and other shades of opinion. The Think Tank is viewed by cynics as a mechanism for closing public debate on the issues of transition, and thereby negating the generation of national consensus, despite the fact that all Ugandans are deemed to be members of the Movement. The Think Tank is mandated to study the issue of the expansion of political space and the modalities of doing so. It has been working informally and confidentially due to the sensitivity of the issue and has adopted a deliberately cautious approach in order not to undermine the work of the CRC.
The Electoral Commission faces financial constraints. More profoundly, it suffers from a great deal of political interference and thus lacks independence. The Electoral Commission has limited legitimacy and public respect due to its composition and operational incompetence. For example, it has consistently failed to set election dates and ensure the smooth running of elections such as having proper registers, enough ballot paper and boxes and has failed to identify polling stations, among others. It has also failed to objectively handle the increasing vote rigging and electoral violence. Neither has it provided effective civic education as mandated.
The Buganda Government has persistently vied for the return of Federalism. Although 97% of Buganda wanted the Federal system of government, and 67% of the whole country supported the federal idea during the constitution-making process, the Constitution ignored it. The Federal system was strongly advocated on the following grounds:
-
During the federal system of governance, Uganda witnessed the best income per capita, and infrastructure in terms of schools and hospitals.
- Preservation of cultural heritage and the promotion of strong traditional values.
- Decentralisation of power from the centre.
- Good leadership with enhanced accountability.
In spite of the foregoing challenges, a number of opportunities were identified as a basis for promoting constitutionalism in Uganda.
In spite of the numerous lawsuits levied against both journalists and newspapers, the media in Uganda is vibrant and has promoted public debate on a whole variety of issues. In particular, the media has made a tremendous contribution to political education and debate as well as provided credible information and exposed corruption. Many respondents commended the Monitor newspaper and also appreciated the objectivity of The New Vision, its government ownership notwithstanding.
Democracy is always a struggle, and it is thus important to have institutions to mediate or resolve conflicts. Overall, the judiciary enjoys the confidence and faith of the disputants, as illustrated by the continuous resort to settle political disputes through the law, as was the case with the Besigye case, the opposition over the constitutionality of Art 269, the referendum and the numerous electoral petitions.
There has been increasing independence of the judiciary in Uganda, particularly of the High Court and the Supreme Court, with several test cases witnessed in recent years. However, there was concern over the timidity of the Court of Appeal/Constitutional Court. For example, after the Court had rendered the 1999 Referendum law null and void, Parliament passed a new Referendum Act 2000 within a matter of hours in order to validate the referendum process. Subsequently, a new amendment was made to the Constitution, which stated that henceforth, if any party wanted to challenge the proceedings of Parliament, they had to seek the permission of the Speaker to access any records. This raises serious doubts about the commitment of Parliament to uphold constitutionalism. The Court of Appeal held that the constitution can be amended in one day, and that the requisite materials need not be published in the gazette. Again, although it is apparent that the constitution contains contradictory provisions, rather than iron out these inconsistencies, the Constitutional Court decided that each provision stands on its own. This is one of the examples illustrating the failure of the Constitutional Court to develop a constitutional law jurisprudence.
The UHRC has been commended as an overseer for the respect of human rights. Although a government institution, it has diplomatically pointed out the flaws of government in its use of power including torture, and decried the army intervention in politics particularly in elections. The UHRC provides hope to many Ugandans that there are at least some institutions that can speak out against the excesses of governmental power.
Religion can be used positively, given that most Ugandans profess one religious belief or another. Under the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), which is an amalgamation of three churches, there has been an active promotion of civic and political education. UJCC also has a permanent observer status in Parliament.
Many civil society organisations, such as the Uganda Law Society were at the forefront of the constitution-making process, and laid particular focus on the Bill of Rights. Additionally the ULS has instituted a number of test cases. However, it was also noted that any civil society organisation that comes out to criticise the government is branded the opposition, without investigating the merits of the issues that are being raised.
International and regional initiatives were strongly recommended because national interventions are usually undermined on account of being partisan. It was further recommended that the East African Community (EAC) should use its framework to strengthen democracy in the Kenya and Uganda. This may be done in small missions for a particular cause, as was done by KCK.
6.0 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONSUganda is faced with a real crisis. Whatever decision it makes will have repercussions for a considerable period of time. The only people who can decide are Ugandans themselves.
At the same time, the world is moving forward. The one party system had its historical moment. There was a time when it was not only fashionable, but in certain societies, historically necessary as well. That period has now passed. Perhaps the Movement System was necessary in 1986 and for a few years thereafter; is it still necessary now? It is true that Uganda has undergone a terrible past, but is there no other political system that can make Uganda forge ahead with different schools of thought, without forgetting its past?
Of all the people we interviewed, only two were strongly opposed to the idea of Uganda re-introducing a multiparty system. Because of the offices they hold, both of them can be said to be very close to the President. Since we also met others closer to the President who hold contrary ideas, we cannot assume that what our two respondents were telling us is necessarily close to the President’s thinking. Unfortunately, we did not seek an appointment in advance to have an audience with the President. But it is important that the President formally opens up a national debate on the issue, and sits back and listens to what the people have to say. He should have an open mind, in the sense that he accepts whatever the people’s verdict would be.
Neither the Movement nor the political parties have adequately prepared for the transition in such a way that it does not happen abruptly. There is need for a strategic, pragmatic and reasoned approach to political liberalisation in a manner which is non-confrontational, with a detailed timetable for action. Pragmatically, the debate on ensuring a peaceful transition should begin. It would be useful to outline all the possible activities of what a political party can engage in, and what is prohibited by the Constitution; in other words, express in more detail what the Constitution does not disallow and assess what can be done in a pragmatic manner in preparation for the transition period. This would entail developing a code of conduct. On the other hand, a meaningful process of transition can only be effective after deleting Article 269 of the Constitution. The effect of Article 269 is to outlaw or render parties useless by restricting political space, without which there is no social basis for democracy. Furthermore, the fact that 60 delegates walked out of the CA over the debate of Article 269 and many more protested the denial of political party operations at district level, illustrates the dissent of a substantive minority, which cannot be ignored or wished away. Hence there is an imperative for dialogue.
In the initial stages of the transition, Uganda must avoid the crude politics of “winner takes all.” The future is neither here nor there… there is need for a transformation on all sides. The Movement alone may not be trusted to manage the
transition. A government of national unity must be based on consensus and not conscription, such as the ordering through law that all people in Uganda must belong to the Movement system. A government of National Unity composed of existing parties, federalists, various shades of Movementists, as in South Africa, may be more ideal. Whatever happens,
there must be a system to reinforce inclusiveness. There is therefore a need to create a middle ground with the freedom to dialogue and trust each other as well to bring the maximum number of people into the process. The price tag of the above is the commitment to unite Uganda in a bloodless transition.
Similarly, multipartyism on its own without the institutional framework to build it, is not the answer. It would equally illusory and politically wrong to ignore the positive contribution of the Movement to the political development of Uganda. A hybrid situation taking into account the benefits of the Movement system may be put in place. For example, the adoption of the participatory nature of village local council politics and competition on individual merit amongst candidates from the same party, would refine multipartyism.
Uganda has to be very honest about its past in designing a lasting solution. The Army is central to the politics of Uganda, that any sudden de-linkage of the institution from politics would be radical and counterproductive given the history of interference in
the process of governance by the army.
Hence, the process of transition is extremely crucial.
The issues of transition include making the army feel secure and significant in the future of Uganda. This necessitates a framework of negotiation and consensus building which goes beyond putting the law in place. The army has to be educated anew to accept and appreciate multiparty politics in order to enable it perform as a national army; a national institution without any partisan loyalty. This would not be easy
because the army is sharing power with the Movement in a quasi-military arrangement. Recognising that the army is a key power player, the critical question is: What power interests are likely to be negotiated? Whatever the answer to this question, the fundamental principle that must be upheld is that the elected government must rule.
A substantive majority of Ugandans are ignorant of good multiparty practices and the various forms of multipartyism. The youth have been sensitised to believe that to be
proper citizens, they should all agree, and that disagreement is bad. Yet democracy dictates the tolerance of divergent views.
Civic Education has to be undertaken in advance to enable all actors learn and appreciate what multipartyism involves, and how to play by the rules of the game. Additionally, Uganda needs a good regulatory/legislative framework and a review of laws to promote ‘genuine’ multipartyism.
For a serious debate to take place on whether or not the country should open up, there must be mechanisms which can direct that kind of debate and a time frame established within which such a debate can take place.
There has been a remarkable mushrooming of both the print and electronic media in Uganda. Generally, the media have been very objective in their reporting and presentation of materials. There is no reason why the media cannot conduct a national debate on the question of liberalisation of the political system. For this to be done in a constructive way, guidelines would need to be issued on how the debate has to be conducted. Either a media council or an association of journalists would have to be asked to monitor the debate in the media and at the end present a report to the nation.
It is less than twenty-five years since the referendum has been in use in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Before the debate in the United Kingdom on whether or not Britain should join the then European Economic Community, no referendum had been held either in Britain or in its former colonies. Today in several countries the referendum is used in determining very important issues confronting society. But it is not always that the right answer to a country’s problem can be obtained through a referendum. If Tanzania had conducted a referendum in 1991 on whether or not to allow a multiparty system, the overwhelming majority would have voted for the continuation of the single party system. But by avoiding a referendum and instead appointing a commission which gathered people’s views and subsequently made rational recommendations, Tanzania was able to avert a crisis and come up with a decision that was applauded even by those who, in a referendum, would have voted against it. Should Uganda decide to go for another referendum through a motion of parliament, as provided by the constitution, to decide on whether or not it should adopt a multiparty system, it should do so after a prolonged and informed debate over the matter.
Electoral campaigns can constitute an important part of the political education of a society. Such issues as political liberalisation can be highlighted in electoral campaigns by both supporters and opponents. In this way, therefore, the general public can come to grips with the issues involved and be able to reach informed opinions.
One of the major contradictions in the Ugandan Constitution is that political parties are allowed to exist but their activities are restricted to such an extent that they are almost non-existent. But even within the restrictions that they are allowed to operate, they can still engage in a national debate on the future constitutional and political order for Uganda. Either individually or collectively, political parties can launch a nation-wide campaign on the kind of political system they want adopted in Uganda.
As pointed out in this Report, the Movement’s National Executive Committee appointed an ad-hoc committee to recommend the Movement’s position on the question of liberalisation. From the public statements issued by some of the Movement’s personalities, it is obvious that there are differences of opinion in the Movement’s leadership on this matter. It would be healthy for the country if these differences are aired in the open, and the Movement allows a free debate to take place even amongst its leadership.
As part of its review exercise the CRC can monitor and co-ordinate the national debate, and then make the necessary recommendations as it sees fit. The issue of political liberalisation might not be part of its ‘terms of reference’, but it is at the heart of any democratic dispensation and cannot be avoided forever.
The following recommendations are made not as prescriptions on what should be done, but rather as inputs into further discussion of the issue. They may be further refined or discarded, depending at what point in time they are considered for adoption.
The Process Question is the most important issue and challenge at the core of the ongoing constitutional review process. It is important to have an all inclusive and transparent process, which can generate a national consensus. Lack of a legitimate process jeopardises the legitimacy of the CRC. In other words, building a national consensus is the primary task of CRC, which makes the methodology of the CRC fundamentally critical to the success of the review. In this respect, the Mission recommends that Uganda conducts a national debate on the subject of political liberalization, in a good spirit as well as in an atmosphere without fear and the threat of reprisal.
People must argue and not shout in order to be heard. Ugandans need to frame the questions necessary for the development of a constructive dialogue. In the final analysis, words count and a meaningful dialogue dictates that each side understands the exact meaning imputed in the words used in order to speak on the same wavelength. They must discuss the basic social contract between the leaders and the populace and their basic expectations of any form of democratic government. It is recognised that there is no single path to democracy and good governance. What is important is to fulfil the social contract and to represent the will of the majority, while respecting the interests of the minority.
Silence is mind numbing. It is certainly no soil in which to nurture a democratic culture. Internal discussion, disagreement and debate are not a sign of weakness, but of good health. Only those who explain their action and open them up for public debate can hope to identify and rectify
mistakes in time. Pragmatism and follow the leader are indeed poor substituted for public debate. Mamdani 1995; And Fires Does Not Always beget Ash.
In summation every shade of opinion or views need to contest for acceptance with all its weaknesses and strengths and let the people decide.
7.2.
Building on the Existing Opportunities
It was recognised that the mere presence of a constitutional review process inevitably means the centrality of the issue of political systems as part of the review process and affirms that the debate for the political liberalization of Uganda was on. Similarly, the revival of the monarchial systems and the existence of both multi-partyists and movementist in Parliament signified acceptance of challenging political forces and accommodation of dissenting views by government. In order to build national consensus and forge a way forward for Uganda, the opposition was urged to take stock of the achievements so far made by the Movement and to draw on past lessons.
7.3.
The National Conference.
Constitutional reform like any social reform should be discussed in a free environment, with security and without fetters on freedom of expression. Despite the vibrant media,
the practical manifestation of the freedom of expression is a moot question. Sensitisation by the CRC or NGOs cannot be a substitute to public debates of the proponents and opponents of particular views. The protagonists of political positions stand in good stead to inform the people about their positions.
For these reasons the Mission recommends the National Conference enable all Ugandans to
ultimately find a national consensus on the political scheme for the future of Uganda.
7.4.
To the CRC
:
The CRC should provide an interim report to government, recommending the establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the National Conference as a first step to secure popular participation of all interested stakeholders. The objective of the National conference should be to generate consensus on the political systems in Uganda and the way forward for political liberalisation of Uganda in general.
1. In order to effectively manage the National Conference the CRC should recommend the establishment of a Preparatory Committee with specific terms of reference, detailing its operational resource base and viability, function, composition and inclusivity of all political interest groups.
ii) The Preparatory Committee should represent wide national political interests with the participation of all key leadership in Uganda, including civil society, religious institutions. While constitution making should be the responsibility of the citizens of a given country, it is ideal to involve the East Africa Community as observers.
iii) The main role of the Preparatory Committee would be to discuss the modalities such as a detailed time table and necessary resources for the successful implementation of the National Conference.
7.5.
To Government
In order to create appropriate conditions for progress towards plural politics in Uganda and maximise democratic opportunity within the present constitutional set up, Government should do the following :
i) Establish a legal framework for the control of operational activities;
ii) Separate the army from the Presidency;
iii) Subject the army to civilian control and supervision and
iv) Ensure the resignation of members of the Executive from the army.
3. The Movement should put in place a level playing field for political competition and ensure that within the present political set there is inclusiveness of all political interests in order to prevent Uganda from lapsing into a state of anarchy and war on account of unaccommodating political thinking.
4. Reconstitute the existing institutional framework, such as that of the Electoral Commission and the CRC to ensure greater inclusiveness, more transparency, better operation and enhanced public trust.
5. President Museveni should respect the existing constitutional limits and government should ensure the peaceful hand over of power on the termination of his term in 2006.
6. The Executive should respect the separation of powers and resist from interference with the powers of the legislature and the judiciary.
7.
The Electoral Commission, government agencies and non-governmental organisations should conduct a very deep and thorough civic education campaign amongst the people all over the country.
8.
Decentralisation has enhanced popular participation of the people in governance. Simultaneously, the flaws and mal-practices, such as excessive corruption should be addressed with precision and commitment.
9. Seriously address corruption, ethnicity, nepotism and favoritism with due diligence and transparency.
10. Make ministers ex-officio members of Parliament in order to promote the separation of powers and the independence of Parliament.
11. Abolish the position of presidential advisor
12. Conduct Presidential and Parliamentary elections on the same day, in order to save resources and time, as well as to limit manipulation and corruption.
7.6.
To Civil Society
In order to create appropriate conditions for progress towards plural politics in Uganda and maximise democratic opportunity within the present constitutional set up, civil society should do the following:
1. Work in partnerships with the East African Community and its institutions in order to advance constitutionalism in the region
2. Strengthen the national debate through mediation of the different interests
3. Engage the transition process and make judgments and recommendations for areas of improvement
7.7.
To The Post Referendum 2000 Group of Donors
Donors should be objective and consistent in their support for the democratisation process in Africa by applying the
same standards in Uganda as elsewhere.
7.8.
To KCK
1. Provide more elaborate recommendations which encompass the comprehensive findings of the Mission. The specific recommendations in the text of the report made by the respondents should form part of the Mission’s recommendations.
2. Provide a detailed analysis of federalism and the role of traditional institutions without trivialising the issues as merely a Buganda factor.
3. Continue to offer rational input in the ongoing process, as a regional centre for constitutionalism. Such activities include monitoring the constitutional progress and acting as a conduit of negotiation between the two major political blocks.
4. Launch the report as a documentation of Uganda’s history and a spring board to further guide other actions.
5. Do a thorough study on the process of electioneering in Uganda in particular and the region at large with the aim of asserting the practical manifestations of “power belonging to the people” by enhancing their ability to choose leaders, and make a catalogue of best practices and lessons.
7.9.
Cross cutting Recommendations
1.
Linking constitutional issues to improved welfare:
Welfare issue as an expression of the democratic demands for guarantees of political
and economic rights by the grassroots communities should be directly addressed as constitutional issues directed at the improvement of the livelihood of the people. Any debate on political development in Uganda in isolation of the economic situation would be futile for failure to respond to the aspirations and
needs of the majority of Ugandans.
2.
Identify relevant institutions capable of processing the information obtained regarding the economic problems facing the people of Uganda, as a basis upon which solutions to improve the economic conditions of the people of Uganda could be devised.
3.
Civic Education: A substantive majority of Ugandans are ignorant of good multiparty practices and the various forms of multipartyism. The youth have been sensitised to believe that to be
proper citizens, they should all agree, and that disagreement is bad. Yet democracy dictates the tolerance of divergent views.
Civic Education has to be undertaken in advance to enable all actors learn and appreciate what multipartyism involves, and how to play by the rules of the game. Additionally, Uganda needs a good regulatory/legislative framework and a review of laws to promote ‘genuine’ multipartyism.
4.
Review the experience of
other countries such as South Africa for its lessons in building a government of national unity, Kenya and Tanzania for the experience in moving from a
one-party system of government to a multi-party system of government. For example, for the Nyalali Commission of Tanzanian, t
he
decision to opt for multipartism was contingent upon substantive arguments rather than statistics. This was influenced by President Nyerere’s openness to the idea and support for dialogue on
multipartism which rendered redundant the
necessity of a referendum. Nevertheless, Ugandans were cautioned that different approaches could work in certain countries and not others. Additionally,
Pan Africanism and the East african Community with the participation of East Africans is a useful channel of solving problems in African.
5.
Educate themselves about the political history of the country in order to actively participate in the informal debate about the transition.
6.
Work towards the general transformation of
the way power is exercised at various societal levels, in order to make constitutionalism a living experience.
7.
Have comprehensive civic education to enable all Ugandans, particularly the actors learn and appreciate what multipartism involves, and how to play by the rules of the game.
8.
In order for African leaders to give up clinging to power, a general amnesty should be given to them
to circumvent prosecution for criminal acts and abuse of office
9.
Make a case for the continuation of affirmative action in Uganda as a national and universal issue, which should not be aligned to the Movement system.
1. Dr. D. N. Bazaara - Executive Director, Centre for Basic Research
3. Hon. Kawanga Semwogerere - President, Democratic Party
4. His Eminence Cardinal Wamala – Catholic Church
5. Mr. Robert Kabushenga - Corporation Secretary, The New Vision Newspaper
6. Ms. Betty Kamya - Spokesperson, Reform Agenda
7. Hon. Sarah Bagalaaliwo - Member of the East African Legislative Assembly
8. Hon. Eriya Kategaya – Minister of Internal Affairs & First Deputy Prime Minister
9. Mr. Francis Gureme – Journalist
10. Hon. Ken Lukyamuzi – Member of Parliament
11. Mr. John Matovu - President, Uganda Law Society
12. H.E. Fleming Bjork Pedersen – Danish Ambassador
13. Hon. Peter Mayiga – Minister, Buganda Government
14. H.E. Teitelbaum – Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
15. Mr. Don Elliot - Advisor , Democracy & Governance, USAID
16. Hon. Kibirige Mayanja – Former Presidential Aspirant
17. Mr. Hussein Kyanjo- Former campaign Manager for Hon. Kibirige Mayanja
18. H.E. Martin O’Fainin - Irish Charge d’Affaires
19. Mr. Wilberforce Seryazi – Outgoing President, Makerere Law Society
20. Hon. Winnie Byanyima- Member of Parliament
21. Hon. Jaberi Bidandi Ssali - Minister for Local Government
22. H.E. Dauda Toure – UNDP Resident Representative
23. Capt. Kakooza -Mutale – Senior Presidential Advisor on Political Affairs
24. Mr. Fritz Kopseiker – Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
25. Hon. Cecilia Ogwal - Member of Parliament & UPC Leader
26. Prof. Fredrick Jjuuko - Professor of Law, Makerere University
27. Mr. Sam Njuba - Chairperson Reform Agenda & Former Minister of Constitutional Affairs
28. Mr. Livingstone Sewanyana – Executive Director, FHRI
29. Hon. Gertrude Njuba - Senior Assistant Presidential Advisor
30. Mr. Constantine Karusoke - Commissioner, Uganda Human Rights Commission
Avirgan T. and M. Honey (1982). War in Uganda – The Legacy of Idi Amin. London: Zed Press.
Bazaara N. (200): Contemporary Civil Society and the Democratisation Process in Uganda – A Preliminary Exploration. Kampala: CBR Publications.
Barya J-J. (2000): The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution – Achieving Consensus by Law. Kampala: CBR Publications.
------- (1993): Popular Democracy and the Legitimacy of the Constitution. Kampala: CBR Publications.
CBR (1996): The Demobilisation of Military Personnel – An Assessment. Kampala: CBR Publications.
Furley O. and J. Katalikawe (1999): No-Party Democracy – Uganda’s Election to the Constituent Assembly. Kampala: CBR Publications.
Gariyo Z. (1993): The Media, Constitutionalism and Democracy in Uganda. Kampala: CBR Publications.
Hansen H. B. and M. Twaddle (eds.) (1989): Uganda Now. London: James Curry.
Ibingira G. S. K. (1973): The Forging of an African Nation – The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Uganda from Colonial Rule to Independence, 1894 – 1962. New York: Viking Press.
Kanyeihamba G. (1975): Constitutional Law and Government in Uganda – The Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau.
Mamdani M. (1976): Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. London and New York: Monthly Review Press.
--------- (1993): Pluralism and the Right of Association. Kampala: CBR Publications.
Mugaju J. and J. Oloka-Onyango (eds.) (2000): No-Party Democracy in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
Museveni Y. K. (1997): Sowing the Mustard Seed – The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda. London: Macmillan.
Nyerere J.K. (1968): Freedom and Socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.
Oloka-Onyango J. (2000): Civil Society, Democratisation and Foreign Donors in Contemporary Uganda – A Conceptual and Literature Review. CBR Publications.
---------- (1993): Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda. Kampala: CBR Publications.
Opolot S. J. (2000): Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in Uganda – A String of Fragile Pearls. Kampala: CBR Workshop Report No.12.
Republic of Uganda: The Constitution of Uganda 1962.
-------- The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1967 Constitution).
----------- The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1967 (Revised Edition 1991).
-------- The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995.
Shivji I. G. (1991): State and Constitutionalism – An African Debate on Democracy. Harare: SAPES Books.
Ssenkumba J. (2000): NRM Politics, Political Parties and the Demobilisation of Organised Political Forces. Kampala: CBR Publications.
United Republic of Tanzania: The Presidential Commission on Single Party or
Multiparty System in Tanzania, 1991. Vol.1. Report and Recommendations
Of the Commission on the Democratic System in Tanzania. Printed by
Dar es Salaam University Press.
APPENDIX III
Dissemination Workshop Report